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I. REFUSING TREATMENT: DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS 
In the interface of psychiatry and law, no issue has generated-more 
controversy1 than the claim by involuntarily confined mental patients of 
a right to refuse psychotropic medication.2 The debate was fueled by 
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1. See, e.g., Jonathan Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo, and Rogers: The Burger Court 
and Mental Health Law Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 345 (1983) ("The 
question of whether patients have a right to refuse treatment is probably the most 
controversial issue in forensic psychiatry today."); William M. Brooks, A Comparison 
of a Mentally Ill Individual's Right to Refuse Medication Under the United States and 
the New York Constitutions, 8 TOURO L. REV. 1, 1 ( 1991) ("The right of a mentally ill 
and involuntarily hospitalized individual to refuse medication prescribed by a psychiatrist 
has divided the legal and psychiatric professions more than any other recent issue."); 
Bruce J. Winick, New Directions in the Right to Refase Mental Health Treatment: The 
Implications of Riggins V. Nevada, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 205, 206 (1993) 
("[T]he issues surrounding the availability and dimensions of such a right remain mired 
in controversy."). 
2. In legislation, court decisions, and legal scholarship, the words "psychotropic," 
"antipsychotic," and "neuroleptic" are often used indiscriminately to refer to medication 
prescribed to treat people with major mental disorders. The words, however, are not 
synonymous. "Psychotropic" is derived from two root words, "psycho-" meaning the 
mind or mental processes, and "-tropic" meaning changing or directing. Thus, 
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two early, and often-cited,3 articles---one asserting that the right to 
refuse psychiatric treatments is necessary to inhibit a ''therapeutic 
orgy," 4 the other asserting that patients who are allowed to refuse 
needed medication are permitted to "rot with their rights on."5 
psychotropic medications include all chemical agents that act on and affect the mind. 
ROBERT J. W ALDINGER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PSYCHIATRY 396 (1986). Antipsychotic 
medications, also known as neuroleptic medications or major tranquilizers, are one type 
of psychotropic medication and are used to treat thought disorders such as schizophrenia. 
Other psychotropic medications include antidepressants and mood stabilizers. These 
drugs are used to treat mood disorders. Id. at 397-98. Lithium, for example, is used to 
treat manic-depressive illness, and is classified as a mood stabilizer. Id. at 434; see Brief 
for the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington State Psychiatric 
Association as Amici Curiae at 2-3 n.1, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 
88-599). Because the claim of a right to refuse treatment applies to involuntary mental 
patients with either thought or mood disorders, I have used the broader word 
"psychotropic" in this article. 
3. See, e.g., Catherine E. Blackburn, The "Therapeutic Orgy" and the "Right to 
Rot" Collide: The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs Under State Law, 27 Haus. L. 
REV. 447, 449-50 (1990); Alexander D. Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic 
Medications: Law and Policy, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 339, 343 (1987); Winick, supra 
note 1, at 207. 
4. Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to 
Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 461 (1978). · 
5. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On": 
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 1 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Gutheil, 
"Rotting With Their Rights On "]; see also Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, 
The Boston State Hospital Case: "Involuntary Mind Control, " the Constitution, and the 
"Right to Rot", 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 720 (1980) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Gutheil, 
The Boston Hospital Case]; Thomas G. Gutheil, In Search of True Freedom: Drug 
Refusal, Involuntary Medication, and "Rotting With Your Rights On", 137 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 327 (1980) (editorial). The ''rotting with their rights on" language may 
have been paraphrased from a well-known article published six years. earlier in which 
the psychiatrist-author charged that legal reforms to the civil commitment process might 
enable mental patients to die with their rights on. Darold A. Treffert, Dying With Their 
Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041 (1973). 
In one article, Appelbaum and Gutheil criticize a judge for using "[ s ]uch loaded terms 
as 'involuntary mind· control' to describe the effect of antipsychotic medications.'.' 
Appelbaum & Gutheil,. The Boston Hospital Case, supra at 721. The authors assert that 
psychiatrists administer drugs not to control minds but to restore them to the patients' 
control. Id. Ironically, for those who critique the inappropriate use of language by 
others, use of the word ''rotting" seems most inapt. The bodies of people with 
schizophrenia or other nonorganic mental disorder do not undergo any rotting or decay 
even if they never receive the benefit of psychotropic medication. Even if "rotting" is 
given a broader definition to refer to untreated people "wasting away" while confined 
indefinitely in mental hospitals, the word is inappropriate. Regardless of whether they 
accept or refuse treatment, mentally disordered persons can only be involuntarily 
committed so long as their mental conditions meet the jurisdiction's involuntary 
commitment criteria. Often doctors discharge patients who are found competent to 
refuse treatment. 
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Although the rhetoric of subsequent publications is somewhat less 
polemic,6 legal and psychiatric commentators remain intensely interested 
in the subject. One author7 divided the voluminous scholarship8 into 
three categories, the first focusing on theoretical justifications for the 
right,9 the second on psychiatric objections to the right, 10 and the third 
6. But see Barry B. Perlman, Letter to the Editor, 38 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 673 (1987). Dr. Perlman, Director of Psychiatry at St. Joseph's Medical 
Center in Yonkers, New York, asserted that the right to refuse treatment creates an 
"unworkable situation." To pressure the legislature to remedy the problem, Dr. Perlman 
recommended that hospital staff members be encouraged to bring criminal charges 
against mental patients who cannot be medicated legally but who commit assaults. Dr. 
Berman cautioned, however, that prosecution of mental patients "would have to be 
carefully explained to the public as acts on behalf of the proper treatment of patients, 
lest a backlash against caregivers occur." Id. 
7. Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions?: 
Stripping the Facade from United States v. Charters, 38 KAN. L. REV. 957, 957-58 
(1990). 
8. In 1987, Alexander Brooks declared that the legal and psychiatric literature on 
the right to refuse treatment was "voluminous." Brooks, supra note 3, at 339 n. l. In· 
comprehensive, but not exhaustive, footnotes, Brooks cited 34 articles and five book 
chapters in the legal literature published between 1975 and 1986, and 23 articles and 
eight book chapters in the psychiatric literature published between 1973 and 1987. Id. 
at 340 nn.1-2. See also AB.A. COMM'N ON MENTALLY DISABLED, THE RIGHT TO 
REFUSE ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 101-10 (David Rapoport & John Parry eds., 1986) 
for an annotated bibliography of 70 right to refuse treatment articles published between 
1974 and 1985. For examples of more recent scholarship, see authorities cited infra 
notes 9-11. 
9. See, e.g., Blackbum, supra note 3; Brooks, supra note I; Dennis E. Cichon, 
The Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of the Right to Refase Antipsychot-
ic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283 (1992); Ellen W. Clayton, From Rogers to Rivers: The 
Right of the Mentally Ill to Refase Medication, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 13 (1987); Donald 
H.J. Hermann, Autonomy, Self Determination, the Right of Involuntarily Committed 
Persons to Refuse Treatment, and the Use of Substituted Judgment in Medication 
Decisions Involving Incompetent Persons, 13 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 361 (1990); 
Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993); Perlin, supra note 7; Winick, supra note 1; Bruce J. Winick, 
On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705 (1992) 
[hereinafter Winick, On Autonomy]; Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health 
Treatment: A First Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter 
Winick, A First Amendment Perspective]; Jeannette Brian, Comment, The Right to 
Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment and the Supreme Court: Washington v. Harper, 
40 BUFF. L. REV. 251 (1992); Skye F. Gibson, Comment, A Bright Thread for 
California's Legal Crazy-Quilt: A Proposed Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 22 
U.S.F. L. REV. 341 (1988); Anne Hull, Note, The Mentally Ill's Right to Refuse Drug 
Treatment: A Panacea or a Bitter Pill to Swallow?, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 62 (1989); 
James A. King, Comment, An Involuntary Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment 
with Antipsychotic Drugs: A Reassessment, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 1135 (1987); Lisa 
Litwiller, Note, Defining Constitutional Parameters: The Forced Drugging of Civilly 
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on empirical studies of results occurring when the right was implement-
ed.11 He characterized the proliferation of scholarship in these catego-
ries as the emergence of "cottage industries."12 
After a twenty-year debate, survival of the right to refuse treatment 
seems assured. Alan Stone, M.D., noted Harvard psychiatrist and former 
President of the American Psychiatric Association, found that the legal 
justifications for the right to refuse treatment were so "clear and 
Committed Mental Patients, 1 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 57 (1992); Mary C 
Mccarron, Comment, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: Safeguarding the 
Mentally Incompetent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 477 
(1990). 
10. See, e.g., PAUL s. APPLEBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK 
OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 97-104 (2d ed. 1991); Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to 
Refuse Treatment With Antipsychotic Medications: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 413 (1988); Paul S. Appelbaum & Warren F. Schwartz, Minimizing the 
Social Cost of Choosing Treatment for the Involuntarily Hospitalized Mentally-Ill 
Patient: A New Approach to Defining the Patient's Role, 24 CONN. L. REV. 433 (1992); 
Samuel J. Brake! & John M. Davis, Taking Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental 
Patients and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 25 IND. L. REV. 429 (1991); Gregory B. 
Leong & J. Arturo Silva, The Right to Refuse Treatment: An Uncertain Future, 59 
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 284 (1988); Stephen Rachlin, Rethinking the Right to Refuse Treatment, 
19 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 213 (1989). 
11. See, e.g., Renee L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Involuntary Patients' Right to 
Refuse Medication: Impact of the Riese Decision on a California Inpatient Unit, 19 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 351 (1991); J. Richard Ciccone et al., Right to 
Refuse Treatment: Impact a/Rivers v. Katz, 18 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
203 (1990); Francine Cournos et al., A Comparison of Clinical and Judicial Procedures 
for Reviewing Requests for Involuntary Medication in New York, 39 HOSP. & 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 851 (1988); Frank H. DeLand & Neal M. Borenstein, 
Medicine Court, II: Rivers in Practice, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 38 (1990); Michael G. 
Farnsworth, The Impact of Judicial Review of Patients' Refusal to Accept Antipsychotic 
Medications at the Minnesota Security Hospital, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 33 (1991); William .A. Hargreaves et al., Effects of the Jamison-Farabee Consent 
Decree: Due Process Protection for Involuntary Psychiatric Patients Treated With 
Psychoactive Medication, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 188 (1987); Steven K. Hoge et al., 
A Prospective Multicenter Study of Patients' Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication, 47 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 949 (1990); Robert D. Miller et al., The Impact of the 
Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Patient Population: Six-Month Review, 17 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107 (1989); Pascal Sauvayre, The Relationship 
Between the Court and the Doctor on the Issue of an Inpatient's Refusal of Psychotropic 
Medication, 36 J. FORENSIC Ser. 219 (1991); Ronald Schouten & Thomas G. Gutheil, 
Aftermath of the Rogers Decision:' Assessing the Costs, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1348 
(1990); Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: 
Patients' Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 
1049 (1988); Jeffery T. Young et al., Treatment Refusal Among Forensic Inpatients, 15 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1987); Julie M. Zito et al., New York Under the 
Rivers Decision: An Epidemiologic Study of Drug Treatment Refusal, 148 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 904 (1991) [hereinafter Zito, New York Under Rivers]; Julie M. Zito et al., 
One Year Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a New York State Psychiatric Facility, 12 
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 295 (1989) [hereinafter Zito, One Year Under Rivers]. 
12. Perlin, supra note 7, at 957. 
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compelling"13 that he urged his psychiatrist colleagues to accept the 
right's existence. 14 Dr . Stone conceded that a mentally disordered 
person's refusal of psychotropic medication is merely one example of 
refusal of medical treatment by any ill person.15 In a treatment refusal 
situation, the doctrine of informed consent16 restricts the state's 
authority to intrude on the individual's autonomy.17 Only when the 
individual, whether from mental disorder or other cause, is unable to 
make competent decisions, may another's judgment be substituted. 
Although autonomous decisionmaking is negated by incompetence, 18 
incompetence is not established solely by proof of mental disorder or 
proof that treatment is clinically indicated.19 
Dr. Stone, however, would structure the civil commitment decision to 
deny the right to refuse treatment to those most in need of it. Dr. Stone 
has proposed,20 and the American Psychiatric Association has endorsed 
his proposal,21 that civil commitment be conditioned on a finding of 
incompetence to make treatment decisions. Under the proposal, 
competent mentally disordered people will be neither civilly committed 
nor involuntarily treated, but civilly committed people will be subject to 
involuntary treatment. The right to refuse treatment survives, but it is 
not a right enjoyed by involuntarily confined mental patients. For them, 
the right will be restored only when they are released from confinement. 
13. , Alan A. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment:· Why Psychiatrists Should and 
Can Make It Work, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 358 (1981). 
14. Id. at 360. 
15. Id. at 359. 
16. See Alan A. Stone, Foreword to CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED 
CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY at xi (1984). Stone noted that 
the doctrine of informed consent is supported by both a deontological and a utilitarian 
justification, i.e., the value of individual autonomy and protection against iatrogenic 
harm. Only a utilitarian objection can be offered against it, i.e., that informed consent 
will not work. Stone questioned whether the claim that "doctor knows best" can be 
elevated to a deontological principle that warrants opposition to the doctrine. 
17. See Winick, On Autonomy, supra note 9. Legal doctrine, political theory, and 
principles of psychological well-being support the value of autonomy. Id. at 1772. 
18. Stone, supra note 13, at 359. 
19. Id. 
20. ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 68 
(1975); Stone, supra note 13, at 361; see also Loren H. Roth, A Commitment Law for 
Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1121 (1979). 
21. In 1982, the American Psychiatric Association approved a model civil 
commitment law. The model law is presented and discussed in Clifford D. Stromberg 
& Alan A. Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 275, 333-34 (1983). 
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Dr. Stone's proposal has been severely criticized. The proposal forces 
a decision that may be premature. At the time of the initial civil 
commitment hearing, information on the proposed patient's competence 
to make treatment decisions may not be available. The proposed 
patient's mental disorder may not have been finally diagnosed and a 
treatment plan may not have been developed. How can a proposed 
patient's competence to make an informed decision be measured when 
the treatment has not been prescribed and the risks, benefits, and 
alternative treatments have not been explained?22 Additionally, the 
proposal has been .criticized for eliminating any meaningful opportunity 
for an involuntary mental patient to challenge the doctor's treatment 
decisions.23 Loss of the right to refuse treatment seems particularly 
inappropriate for a patient who was unable to make reasoned treatment 
decisions when initially confined but who has regained competence 
during the period of involuntary commitment.24 
If incompetence to make treatment decisions is a prerequisite for civil 
commitment, the judge or administrative officer conducting the civil 
commitment hearing is unlikely to make a careful assessment of the 
proposed patient's competence.25 If the other criteria for civil commit-
ment have been proven, i.e., the person is mentally disordered and either 
dangerous or unable to provide for basic personal needs, a pro forma 
finding of incompetence is likely if such finding is necessary to place the 
person in a structured environment. 
Fortunately, few states have adopted Dr. Stone's proposal.26 Most 
22. Cichon, supra note 9, at 389. 
23. The 1847 Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association included a 
statement of "Obligations of Patients to Their Physicians." Loren H. Roth, The Right 
to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface, 35 EMORY L.J. 
139, 143 (1986) (quoting AM. MEDICAL ASS'N CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ch. 1, art. 
1, § 2, reprinted in PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHICS 218 (Leake ed. 1927)). The code 
provided that "[t]he obedience of a patient to the prescriptions of his physician should 
be prompt and implicit. He should never permit his own crude opinions as to their 
fitness, to influence his attention to them." Id. 
24. Cichon, supra note 9, at 388. 
25. Id. 
26. In Kansas, a "mentally ill person" is subject to civil commitment. Included 
within the definition of "mentally ill person" is a requirement that the individual "lacks 
capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
2902(h)(2) (Supp. 1993). That term is further defined as an inability "despite 
conscientious efforts at explanation, to understand basically the nature and effects of 
hospitalization or treatment, or [ as an inability] to engage in a rational decision-making 
process regarding hospitalization or treatment, as evidenced by [an] inability to weigh 
the possible risks and benefits." Id. § 59-2902(e). Although another statute declares that 
"a person shall not lose rights as a citizen, property rights or legal capacity by reason 
of being a patient," that statement is specifically subject to limitations imposed by other 
statutes. Id. § 59-2930 (1983). Another statute authorizes medications to be 
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states do not presume or require incompetence as a criterion for civil 
commitment.27 The mentally disordered person's dangerousness to self 
or others, or inability to provide for basic necessities, justifies a 
administered over a patient's objection. See id. § 59-2928(b) (Supp. 1993). 
In Delaware, a "mentally ill person" subject to civil commitment is defined as one 
who is "unable to make responsible decisions with respect to his hospitalization." DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001(1) (1983). Other Delaware statutes, however, do not specify 
whether this inability is determinative of incompetency to refuse treatment. 
In Iowa, Michigan, and South Carolina, civil commitment requires a finding that the 
proposed patient be unable to make responsible decisions regarding treatment (Iowa and 
South Carolina) or the need for treatment (Michigan). IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(14) 
(West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.140l(c) (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op. 1985). In each of these states, however, another statute 
specifically declares that civil commitment does not raise a presumption of incompe-
tence. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.27(1) (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 330.1489(1) (West 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op. 1985). These 
conflicting statutes do not appear to resolve the question of whether the civil 
commitment decision constitutes an adjudication of the patient's incompetence to refuse 
treatment. 
In New Mexico, incompetence to make a treatment decision is not a criterion for civil 
commitment. However, if the civil commitment criteria are present, the committing 
court is required to consider and decide whether the patient is capable of informed 
consent. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 43-1-1 l(D) (Michie 1993). Thus, some New Mexico civil 
committees may be competent to make treatment decisions. See id. § 43-1-5. A 
treatment guardian may be appointed for those who are not. Id. § 43-1-15(B). The 
court specifies a period of time, up to a maximum of one year, during which the 
treatment guardian exercises his or her powers. Id. § 43-1-15(C). 
Similarly, in Idaho, incompetence to make a treatment decision is not a criterion for 
civil commitment. However, a statute requires the order of commitment to "state 
whether the proposed patient lacks capacity to make informed decisions about 
treatment." IDAHO CODE§ 66-329(m) (Supp. 1994). Thus, some Idaho civil committees 
may be competent to make treatment decisions. In Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 
433-34, 816 P.2d 986, 990-91 (1991), the Idaho Supreme Court required the committing 
court to consider evidence of incapacity to make treatment decisions separately from 
evidence of civil commitability and required that a finding of incapacity be supported 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
27. See Blackbum, supra note 3, at 472 n.88, for statutes declaring that civil 
commitment neither raises a presumption of, nor constitutes a finding of, the patient's 
incompetence. See also Cichon, supra note 9, at 350 n.435, for court decisions 
separating the commitment and competence issues. In fact, as of 1985, only eight states 
even allowed civil commitment and competency to be determined in the same 
proceeding. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL. THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 374 
n.35, 405-07 (3d ed. 1985). 
Psychiatrists have strongly supported law reform efforts to assure that civil 
commitment does not automatically deprive patients of their right to vote, to enter into 
contracts, to marry, or to drive automobiles. Stone, supra note 13, at 359. Apparently, 
however, psychiatrists draw the line at patients' decisionmaking authority to refuse 
treatment. 
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deprivation of liberty, but without a separate determination of incompe-
tence, does not justify a deprivation of the patient's right to refuse 
treatment or other rights. 
Although most states have recognized the right of competent, though 
involuntarily committed, patients to refuse treatment, they have divided 
almost equally on the question of procedural protections necessary to 
enforce that right.28 When a mental patient refuses treatment, does due 
process require that his or her competence to make that judgment be 
assessed in a formal hearing before a judge or other law-trained 
decisionmaker or is an informal assessment by a staff psychiatrist or 
hospital committee sufficient? 
In cases on related issues involving mentally disordered persons, the 
United States Supreme Court held that an informal, medical 
decisionmaker model satisfies the due process requirement. In Parham 
v. J.R., decided in 1979, the Supreme Court acknowledged that children 
have a substantial liberty interest in avoiding unnecessary confinement 
for treatment.29 Nevertheless, the Court ruled that parents retain 
plenary authority to obtain treatment for their children in a mental health 
facility subject to a physician's independent examination and medical 
decision.30 Because the commitment decision was deemed "essentially 
medical in character,"31 due process did not require the state to provide 
either a preadmission or a postadmission adversarial hearing before a 
law-trained judicial or administrative officer.32 
Arguably, the Parham precedent is not directly applicable to the right 
to refuse treatment issue. Children, because of their youth and 
immaturity, are subject to the substitute decisionmaking of their parents 
and physicians; competent adults, even if involuntarily confined, should 
not be. A decision to override a competent person's refusal of treatment 
is not essentially medical in character. From their medical expertise, 
doctors know the risks and benefits of, and the alternatives to, treatments 
they are prescribing. The doctrine of informed consent requires them to 
provide this information to their patients. However, as the California 
28. To determine whether an involuntarily committed mental patient's treatment 
refusal will be upheld, 14 states use a medical decisionmaker model and 18 states use 
a judicial decisionmaker model. Blackburn, supra note 3, at 479 & n.101, 493 & n.147. 
29. 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979). 
30. Id. at 604. 
31. Id. at 609. 
32. Id. at 613. For a critique of Parham, see Michael L. Perlin, An Invitation to 
the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice .Warren Burger's "Time-Consuming 
Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 
149 (1981); see also Grant H. Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment 
Issues: A Retrospective and Prospective Assessment, 60 TuL. L. REV. 927, 946-52 
(1986). 
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Supreme Court noted, "The weighing of these risks against the 
individual subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert skill. 
Such evaluation and decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the 
patient alone."33 
In Youngberg v. Romeo, decided in 1982, the United States Supreme 
Court acknowledged that involuntarily. committed mentally retarded 
persons have liberty interests in freedom and safety from restraint and 
that the state must provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to 
assure that those interests are protected.34 In determining whether the 
state has adequately protected the confined person's rights, the Court 
merely required that judgment be exercised by a qualified profession-
al.35 
In Youngberg, the Court focused primarily on the extent of the state's 
affirmative obligation to provide habilitation services - a "right to 
treatment" issue. The Court also deferred to professional judgment on 
the question of whether physical restraints should be imposed in 
individual cases - a "right to refuse treatment" issue. The Youngberg 
Court, however, did not fully consider the right to refuse treatment 
issue.36 Romeo was a profoundly retarded person with the mental 
capacity of an eighteen-month old child.37 Obviously he lacked the 
mental capacity necessary to make treatment decisions. The Court did 
not discuss or decide whether a competent patient can refuse treatment 
that is deemed appropriate in the judgment of a professional. 
Two weeks after announcing Youngberg, the Court vacated the 
judgment of a circuit court of appeals that had recognized the right of 
involuntarily confined mental patients to refuse psychotropic medication. 
The Court remanded the case for further consideration in light of 
Youngberg.38 By implication, the Court was suggesting that deference 
33. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 
(1972). 
34. 457 U.S. 307, 314-19 (1982). 
35. Id. at 321-22. 
36. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the 
Supreme Court acknowledged: "Youngberg . .. did not deal with decisions to administer 
or withhold medical treatment." Id. at 280. 
37. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309. 
38. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), vacating 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(en bane). 
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to professional judgment might also be a usable standard in right to 
refuse treatment cases.39 
In 1990, for the first time, the Supreme Court directly considered 
whether competent mental patients have a right to refuse treatment and, 
if so, who determines their competence. In Washington v. Harper, the 
Court found that a prison inmate possesses a significant liberty interest 
in avoiding the unwanted administration of psychotropic medication.40 
The Court, however, rejected the prisoner's contention that this liberty 
interest prevents the state from overriding his treatment refusal decision 
without a judicial finding of his incompetence.41 The Court upheld a 
prison regulation that authorized the involuntary administration of 
psychotropic medication upon a treating psychiatrist's determination that 
the prisoner was both mentally disordered and dangerous to either 
himself or others.42 The Court read into the regulation a requirement 
that the treatment ordered be in the prisoner's medical interest.43 In the 
Court's judgment, the state's interest in prison safety and security 
warranted involuntary treatment without a full court hearing. If a prison 
regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, it will 
be upheld even if a more rigorous standard of review would ordinarily 
be required to measure the alleged infringement of a fundamental 
constitutional right.44 
39. On remand, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Youngberg 
professional judgment standard. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en bane). 
The Rennie court expressed its belief that the Youngberg Court had declined to limit the 
state's authority by requiring that the treatment ordered be the least intrusive of the 
patient's liberty. Id. at 268. For a critique of the professional judgment standard, 
especially in right to refuse treatment situations in which the individual is asserting a 
negative right against invasive state action, see Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the 
"Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 
102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992); see also Cichon, supra note 9, at 376-405. 
40. 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990). 
41. Id. at 222, 228. 
42. Id. at 227. The prison regulation also authorized the involuntary administration 
of psychotropic medication on prisoners who were both mentally disordered and gravely 
disabled. Id. at 215. In a subsequent opinion, Justice Kennedy, author of the majority 
opinion in Harper, clarified that Harper addressed only the situation in which 
involuntary medication is administered to a prisoner "to insure that the incarcerated 
person ceased to be a physical danger to himself or others." Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. 
Ct. 1810, 1818 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
43. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, three justices 
noted that the state's policy did not require a determination that involuntary treatment 
would advance the prisoner's medical interest. Id. at 244 (Stevens, J., concurring and 
dissenting). Thus, in their judgment the policy inappropriately "sacrifices the inmate's 
substantive liberty interest to refuse psychotropic drugs, regardless of his medical 
interests, to institutional and administrative concerns." Id. at 245-46. 
44. Id. at 223. The Court noted: "There are few cases in which the State's 
interest in combating the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater 
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Because a state can claim no legitimate penological interest in the 
confinement and treatment of noncriminals, the Harper decision appears 
applicable only to mentally ill prisoners. However, could the state's 
interest in the safety and security of its mental treatment facilities 
support the involuntary treatment of dangerous civilly committed patients 
who pose a danger to themselves or other patients?45 Harper provides 
no definitive answer.46 
After disposing of the prisoner's substantive claim, the Court 
addressed the adequacy of the prison regulation's procedural protections. 
The regulation provided for a prisoner-initiated hearing to review the 
treating psychiatrist's decision. A committee consisting of a psychiatrist, 
a psychologist, and the facility's associate superintendent conducts the 
hearing. No committee member can be involved in the prisoner's 
current treatment or diagnosis. If the committee determines that the 
prisoner suffers from a mental disorder and is dangerous, the prisoner 
may be medicated involuntarily.47 The Supreme Court upheld this 
regulation as satisfying procedural due process requirements.48 
than in a prison environment .... " Id. at 225. 
45. The prison regulation used definitions of"mental disorder," "gravely disabled," 
and "likelihood of serious harm" that were identical to the definitions used in the state's 
civil commitment statute. Id. at 215 n.3. Do these similarities suggest that the adoption 
of the same regulation for civilly committed patients would satisfy minimum federal 
constitutional requirements? 
46. Less than a year later, however, the Court hinted that Harper might be 
applicable to a treatment refusal situation that did not involve prison security. Perry v. 
Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (per curiam). In Perry, the Court vacated a Louisiana 
trial court decision ordering a death row inmate to be treated involuntarily with 
psychotropic medication to restore him to competency to be executed. The Supreme 
Court ordered a reconsideration in light of Harper. Id. Although Perry was a prisoner, 
there was no proof that without medication he was dangerous to himself or others. Was 
the Court suggesting that mentally disordered prisoners cannot be treated involuntarily 
if they are not dangerous? Was the Court suggesting that dangerousness is not the only 
justification for treatment of mentally disordered prisoners? On remand, the trial court 
reinstated its order, but, on appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed in part, 
distinguishing Harper. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 747, 751-55 (La. 1992). The 
Louisiana Supreme Court found that the involuntary administration of psychotropic 
medication for the purpose of restoring competence for execution "does not constitute 
medical treatment but forms part of the capital punishment sought to be executed by the 
state." Id. at 753. Under the Louisiana Constitution, such a practice violates the right 
to privacy and constitutes cruel, excessive, and unusual punishment. Id. at 747. 
47. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215-16 (1990). 
48. Id. at 231-35. 
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The Court suggested two reasons why the state may defer to the 
judgment of an internal professional review committee. First, the Court 
noted that the intentions (i.e., judgments) of a mentally disordered person 
are difficult to assess and are changeable.49 Those intentions can be 
better determined by frequent and ongoing clinical observations of 
mental health professionals than by a judge in a single judicial hear-
ing. 50 The Court's assertion is most curious. Under the procedure 
approved by the Court, the internal review committee is not required to 
hold multiple hearings at which the prisoner's intentions are discerned. 
In fact, under the Court's ruling, the prisoner's judgment, whether 
competent or incompetent, is irrelevant. 
Second, the Court was concerned with the costs of a judicial hearing. 
Financial resources and staff time would be diverted from patient 
care.51 The Court cited studies indicating that patient refusals of 
psychotropic medications are upheld infrequently, whether the 
decisionmaker is a judge or a mental health professional, internal or 
external to the facilify.52 Thus, because the regulation approved in 
Harper requires the hearing committee to review the treating staff's 
medical decisions regarding the type and dosage of medication, the state 
could legitimately conclude that an administrative review using medical 
decisionmakers would be more effective than a judicial review.53 The 
Court ignored studies cited in amicus curiae briefs demonstrating that a 
judicial review model that provides therapeutic benefits to patients54 
could be implemented without seriously burdening the mental health 
system.55 
49. Id. at 231. 
50. Id. at 231-32. 
51. Id. at 232. 
52. Id. at 234 n.13. 
53. Id. at 233. 
54. Brief of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems et al. 
as Amici Curiae at 24-27, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-599) 
(Judicial oversight increased the doctor's attention to medication side effects and 
increased the doctor's willingness to accommodate patient needs. An effective 
therapeutic alliance resulted in therapeutic benefit. Patients who refused treatment were 
not adversely affected by any delay from scheduling a competency hearing. They did 
not become violent and disruptive.). 
55. Brief for the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court et al. as Amici Curiae at 16-18, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210 (1990) (No. 88-599) (In Massachusetts, using a judicial review model, patients who 
refused treatment were not hospitalized for longer periods than similarly situated patients 
who accepted treatment. Accidents and injuries to patients and staff did not increase. 
Use of restraints to control violent and destructive behavior did not increase. Because 
hearings were conducted at the mental health facilities, staff time spent away from the 
facilities was small and document preparation time was minimized.). 
For a critique of Harper, see Cichon, supra note 9, at 409-16. 
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Federal courts, often relying on Parham, Youngberg, and Harper, have 
upheld statutes and regulations that use a mental health professional 
decisionmaker model to review mental patient treatment refusals.56 
Nevertheless, the Harper Court insisted on procedural protections to 
insure that the treating professional 's decision to medicate involuntarily 
is neither arbitrary nor erroneous. 57 Therefore, the Court is unlikely to 
uphold the involuntary medication of patients on the unreviewed 
judgment of the treating professional. · 
Recently, the Supreme Court signaled a new direction in its right to 
refuse treatment decisionmaking. In Riggins v. Nevada,58 a criminal 
defendant who had been found mentally competent to stand trial moved 
unsuccessfully for an order suspending the administration of psychotrop-
ic medication during his trial. The Supreme Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction because the trial court, in denying the defendant's 
motion, had not acknowledged the defendant's liberty interest in freedom 
from unwanted medication. The trial court did not make any finding 
that medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state inter-
est.59 By allowing the state to medicate the defendant over his 
objection in the absence of .such a :finding, the trial court may have 
56. See, e.g., Shennan v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397,409 (7th Cir. 
1993) (treating mental health professional decides); Felce v. Fiedler, 974 F.2d 1484, 
1498-500 (7th Cir. 1992) (independent neutral decisionmaker required; must not be 
involved in treatment or diagnosis); United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 312 (4th 
Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990) (treating mental health 
professional decides); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 297-98 (8th Cir. 
1987) (treating mental health professional decides); Johnson v. Silvers; 742 F.2d 823, 
825 (4th Cir. 1984) (professional judgment must be exercised); Project Release v. 
Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 968, 980-81 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal professional review); Rennie 
v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269-70, 274 (3rd Cir. 1983) (internal professional review); 
United States v. Bryant, 670 F. Supp. 840, 844 (D. Minn. 1987) (treating mental health 
professional decides); Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 (W.D. Wis. 1985) 
(treating mental health professional decides); R.A.J. v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1322 
(N.D. Tex. 1984) (internal medical review); Gilliam v. Martin, 589 F. Supp. 680, 682 
(W.D. Okla._ 1984) (treating mental health professional decides); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 
F. Supp. 915, 938-39 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (Some hearing on the patient's competence must 
be held. The decisionmaker need not be legally trained, and may be internal to the 
institution.). 
57. Harper, 494 U.S. at 228. 
58. 504 U.S. 127 (1992) .. 
59. Id. at 138. On remand, the Nevada Supreme Court ordered Riggins retried 
without the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication unless, following the 
cessation of all such medications, the trial court makes the findings required by the 
United States Supreme Court. Riggins v. State, 860 P.2d 705, 705-06 (Nev. 1993). 
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violated the defendant's right to a fair trial.60 Harper's twin require-
ments of overriding justification and medical appropriateness, which 
allow the forced medication of convicted prisoners, are also required for 
criminal defendants.61 In fact, because criminal defendants are not 
confined in prison unless and until they are convicted,62 due process 
may require more deference to their liberty interest than is required for 
prison inmates.63 
The Riggins' majority did not delineate with finality the substantive 
standards that govern the forced medication of criminal defendants.64 
The majority did, however, suggest a standard that "certainly would 
satisf[y] due process."65 Due process would be satisfied if the trial 
court finds that the compelled treatment is "medically appropriate and, 
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the 
defendant's] own safety or the safety of others.''66 Additionally, due 
process might be satisfied if the compelled treatment is medically 
appropriate and an adjudication of guilt or innocence cannot be obtained 
by using less intrusive means.67 
60. Id. The Court noted that the side effects of the psychotropic medication may 
have impacted the 'defendant's "outward appearance, the content of his testimony on 
direct or cross examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his 
communication with counsel." Id. 
61. Id. at 135. 
62. Only sentence-serving prisoners are in "the unique circumstances of penal 
confinement." Id. at 134. 
63. One federal district court has already construed Riggins to require more than 
Harper. In Woodland v Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497 (D. Utah 1993), the plaintiff, who 
was charged with murder, was found mentally incompetent to stand trial. Such a 
finding, however, was held not to include an adjudication of the defendant's incompe-
tence to make treatment decisions. Id. at 1502. In a separate proceeding, the court 
determined that the plaintiff was also incompetent to make treatment decisions. Id. at 
1504. In deciding whether to permit forced medication to restore the defendant's 
competence to stand trial, the court rejected Harper's reduced standard of review. Id. 
at 1509. Citing Riggins, the court required proof of a compelling state interest to 
outweigh the plaintiffs liberty interest. Id. at 1510. The plaintiffs liberty interest is not 
outweighed in the absence of proof that forced medication will render him competent 
to stand trial. Id. at 1512. The state's parens patriae authority does not justify its 
decision to administer psychotropic medication merely by showing that such medication 
is in the plaintiffs medical interest. The plaintiffs liberty interest is protected through 
the appointment of a guardian who considers the incompetent individual's values and 
preferences in deciding whether to consent to treatment. Id. at 1517. 
64. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas asserted 
that the Riggins' majority "appears to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny." Id. at 156 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority denied the assertion. Id. at 136. 
65. Id. at 135. 
66. Id. 
67. However, because Riggins did not claim a right to discontinue psychotropic 
medication if its administration was necessary to continue his competence to stand trial, 
the Court specifically refused to consider whether he, or any competent criminal defen-
dant, had such a right. Id. Justice Kennedy, author of the majority's Harper decision, 
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By focusing the trial court's attention on alternatives to involuntary 
treatment that are less intrusive to the individual's liberty, Riggins 
departs from previous Supreme Court decisions. In Harper, the Court 
imposed no requirement that the state's asserted interest in maintaining 
prison safety be measured against less intrusive alternatives to involun-
tary treatment. Similarly, in Youngberg, the Court imposed no 
requirement that the exercise of professional judgment be tempered by 
a consideration of alternatives that are less intrusive than medically 
appropriate, but involuntary, treatment. Most importantly, the Riggins' 
standard, as worded, requires the consideration of less intrusive 
alternatives,, not of the mental health professional's analysis of the 
medical appropriateness of the proposed treatment, but rather, of the 
state's claimed justification for overriding the individual's treatment 
refusal. The question of whether the forced administration of psycho-
tropic medication is necessary to accomplish an essential state policy is 
not within the expertise of mental health professionals. It is a question 
for the courts to address.68 The Riggins' majority even suggested that 
in deciding individual cases, the trial court should require that the 
substantive standard for involuntary treatment be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.69 
Neither Harper nor Riggins involved treatment refusals by civilly 
committed patients, and the Supreme Court has not determined the 
standard applicable to that context. Civilly committed patients may be 
entitled to greater due process protection than are either prison inmates 
wrote a concurring opinion in Riggins to express his doubt that the state's interest in 
conducting a trial allows it to medicate the defendant involuntarily to assure competence 
to stand trial. Id. at 138-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
68. Although noting that Riggins specifically required the trial court to make the 
necessary findings in the criminal trial context, one commentator questioned whether a 
judicial model would also be required in other right to refuse treatment contexts. In the 
criminal trial context, the trial judge is already involved and making decisions. Thus, 
an administrative decisionmaker is unnecessary to decide the treatment refusal issue. 
Winick, supra note 1, at 220 n.104. However, the consideration of less restrictive 
alternatives, imposed by the Riggins standard, is addressed to the state's justification for 
compelled treatment, not to the medical appropriateness of that treatment. As such, it 
is an issue that is more suited to judicial, rather than to clinical, decisionmaking. 
69. Immediately after presenting a substantive standard for judging the forced 
administration of psychotropic medication, the Court noted that due process requires 
clear and convincing evidence to establish the _criteria for civil commitment. Riggins, 
504 U.S. at 135 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). 
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or criminal defendants.70 The state cannot claim that forced treatment 
of civilly committed patients without any court hearing is necessary to 
maintain prison safety and security. Unlike the prison inmate in Harper, 
civilly committed patients are not subject to punishment in a prison. 
The state cannot claim that forced treatment of civilly committed patients 
without any court hearing is necessary to determine their guilt or 
innocence. Unlike the criminal. defendant in Riggins, civilly committed
patients are not on trial. · · 
Mentally disordered persons who are incapable of living in society or 
are dangerous to themselves or others are subject to civil commitment. 
The state's legitimate interest in protecting them, and in protecting others 
from them, is satisfied by the confinement itself-without coercing 
treatment. Although the state does have a legitimate interest in 
protecting other patients and staff from dangerous mental patients, the 
danger is far less in a mental hospital than it is in a prison.71 At most, 
all that is needed is authority to medicate temporarily when emergencies 
arise.72 In nonemergency situations, greater deference to the civilly 
committed patient's liberty interest in refusing treatment seems 
appropriate. 
It remains to be seen whether, following Riggins, the Supreme Court 
will require an expanded due process model for civilly committed 
patients, or whether, consistent with Youngberg and Harper, a limited 
due process model will be held to suffice. Regardless of how the issue 
is resolved, the Court will only be deciding the minimum required by the 
United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court noted in a treatment 
refusal case, states may recognize substantive liberty interests that are 
more extensive than those protected by the Constitution.73 Those state-
created liberty interests are protected by the federal Due Process 
Clause. 74 A state may also confer procedural protections beyond those 
70. One author has suggested that treatment refusal cases can be divided into three 
categories. Under Harper, prison inmates are subject to a reasonableness standard of 
review. Under Riggins, pretrial detainees are subject to a higher standard of review, 
requiring that the forced administration of psychotropic medication be the leastintrusive 
measure to accomplish a compelling' state objective. Civilly committed patients are 
"entitled to the most exacting standard of review." Cichon, supra note 9, at 419. 
71. See Winick, supra note 1, at 228-29. Winick notes that, unlike prisons, mental 
hospitals have professional and support staff trained in dealing with problems of 
potential violence. Hospitals are also able to deal with violence using alternative 
approaches such as segregation, physical restraints, psychotherapy, and behavior therapy. 
Id. at 229. 
72. Id. at 229. 
73. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982); see also Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277 (1990). 
74. Mills, 457 U.S. at 300. 
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minimally· required by the United States Constitution.75 If the state 
does so, the minimal requirements of the Constitution do not control.76 
Many state courts have relied upon liberty interests derived from state 
constitutions, statutes, and the common-law doctrine ofinformed consent 
to mandate judicial findings of incompetence before treatment refusal 
decisions of civilly-committed patients can be overridden.77 Occasion-
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 
1308, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (1987) (In nonemergency situations, involuntarily 
committed mental patients have statutory rights to exercise informed consent to the use 
of psychotropic medication absent a judicial determination of their incapacity to make 
treatment decisions.); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 967, 973 (Colo. 1985) (en bane) 
(Under the common law and statutes, involuntarily committed persons, whether 
competent or incompetent, have a right to refuse treatment that poses a significant risk 
to their physical well-being. To override a treatment refusal of psychotropic medication, 
a court must find, among other things, that the patient is incompetent to participate 
effectively in the treatment decision.); Goedecke v. State, Dep't oflnsts., 198 Colo. 407, 
411, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (1979) (en bane) (In the absence of a finding by a competent 
tribunal that an involuntarily confined mental patient lacks capacity to make treatment 
decisions, .statutes and the common law afford the patient the right to withhold consent 
to psychotropic medications in nonemergency circumstances.); In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 
200, 204, 641 N£2d 345, 347 (1994) (A statute that authorizes the forced administra-
tion of psychotropic medication only if the court finds, among other things, that the 
civilly committed patient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the 
medication, is not unconstitutional on its face.); In re Orr, 176 Ill. App. 3d 498, 510-12, 
531 N.E.2d 64, 73-74 (1988) (Prior to the enactment of the statute construed in In re 
C.E., supra; the trial court lacked authority to order forced medication as part of the civil 
commitment decision. By statute existing at the time of the decision and by the 
common law doctrine of informed consent, a separate adjudication of incompetency is 
required to override patient refusals in nonemergency situations.); Rogers v. Commis-
sioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 497-98, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314-15 
(1983) (By statute and by common law, involuntarily committed mental patients are 
competent and do not lose the right to refuse treatment until adjudicated incompetent by 
a judge. For patients found incompetent, the judge makes a substituted judgment 
decision.); Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148-50 (Minn. 1988) (The state 
constitution guarantees a right of privacy that is not lost through civil commitment. 
Judicial review is required before a patient may be treated involuntarily with 
psychotropic medication.); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 498, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344, 
504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986) (Neither mental disorder nor institutionalization justifies 
overriding an individual's fundamental right to refuse psychotropic medication. A 
person's due process rights, guaranteed by the state constitution, require that, in each 
case, a court balance the individual's liberty interest against the state's asserted 
compelling need to forcibly medicate.); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 750-52 (Okla. 1980) 
(Under the right to privacy-not further defined as a state or federal right-legally 
competent adult mental patients have a right to refuse treatment with psychotropic 
medication. A judicial proceeding is required to declare a patient incompetent and to 
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ally, a state court has expressly refused to be bound by an ex1stmg 
federal court decision offering less protection to civilly committed 
patients.78 
Numerous empirical studies have been conducted in states that use a 
law-trained decisionmaker model. The studies, and their results, are 
remarkably alike. Typically, the researchers are psychiatrists or other 
mental health professionals. They report that in an overwhelming 
number of cases, the decisionmaker found the patient incompetent, 
overriding his or her treatment refusal.79 The researchers then assess 
appoint a guardian to make an informed judgment for the patient.); Henderson v. Yocum, 
11 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. (ABA) 327 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 1987) (By statute and 
by constitution, involuntarily committed mental patients have a right to refuse psycho-
tropic medication in nonemergency situations. To override a treatment refusal, a court 
must review the patient's competence. If the patient is found incompetent, the court 
must balance the patient's right to refuse against competing state interests and also 
assure that the proposed treatment is provided in the least restrictive way.), ajf'd, 438 
N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1989) (mem.); State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 
734-39, 416 N.W.2d 883, 893-95 (1987) (Because precommitment detainees have a 
statutory right to refuse psychotropic medication, the equal protection clauses of the state 
and federal constitutions are violated by statutes that allow other involuntarily committed 
individuals to be treated over their objection in nonemergency situations. Because a 
court review of competence is required before a precommitment detainee may be 
involuntarily treated, a similar review is also required for other involuntarily admitted 
individuals.). 
In related contexts, courts have mandated judicial hearings of patients' competence 
before involuntary treatment is authorized. See, e.g., Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 
3d 526, 541, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746, 755-56 (1986) (Under the statutes, state prisoners are 
entitled to a judicial determination of their competency to refuse treatment before they 
can be subjected to long-term involuntary psychotropic medication.); People v. Gilliland, 
769 P.2d 477,483 (Colo. 1989) (Involuntarily committed insanity acquittees have a right 
to refuse psychotropic medication. To override their treatment refusals, a court must 
make the same findings that are required to override treatment refusals of civilly 
committed patients.); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730, 731-32 (Ky. Ct. App. 198 l)(In 
the absence of an emergency, the constitution-;iot further defined as state or 
federal - requires a judicial declaration of incompetence before an involuntarily 
committed patient can be compelled to undergo electroconvulsive therapy.); Williams 
v. Wilzack, 319 Md. 485, 510, 573 A.2d 809, 821 (1990) (A state statute authorizing the 
involuntary medication of insanity acquittees without any judicial review was held to 
violate procedural due process under state and federal constitutions. In the absence of 
a valid statute, common law principles applied. Those principles prohibit nonconsensual 
administration of medication on mentally competent adults under nonemergency 
circumstances.); In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 417, 421 N.E.2d 40, 42 
(1981) (In the absence of an emergency, psychotropic medication may be administered 
forcibly to a noninstitutionalized ward only when ordered by a judge.). 
78. See State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis. 2d 710, 742, 416 N.W.2d 
883, 896 (1987) (expressly declining to follow Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128 
(W.D. Wis. 1985)). 
79. See, e.g.; Binder & McNiel, supra note 11, at 353 (A study of 444 patients 
admitted to a 16-bed locked unit in a university psychiatric hospital revealed that 32 
competency hearings were conducted during a 17-month period. Only four patients, i.e., 
12.5%, were found competent.); Ciccone et al., supra note 11, at 211-12 (A study of a 
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the costs involved in holding these hearings and usually express their 
opinion that an alternative, less expensive, model is warranted.80 In a 
107-bed psychiatric service in a private university hospital and an 850-bed state-operated 
psychiatric hospital revealed that 16 competency hearings were conducted during a one-
year period. Only three patients, i.e., 18.8%, were found competent.); Coumos et al., 
supra note 11, at 852-53 (A study of a 1200-bed adult state mental hospital revealed that 
21 competency hearings were conducted during a one-year period. Only three patients, 
i.e., 14.3%, were found competent.); DeLand & Borenstein, supra note 11, at 39-41 (A 
study of a state forensic hospital with an average census of 200 to 250 patients revealed 
that 15 competency hearings were conducted during a one-year period. Not one of the 
15, i.e., 0%, was found competent.); Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 35-37 (A study of a 
state security hospital with 153 patients revealed that 16 competency hearings were 
conducted during a two-year period. Only one patient, i.e., 6.3%, was found 
competent.); Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 950, 952 (A study of 1434 patients admitted 
to four acute inpatient units in state-operated mental health facilities revealed that 19 
competency hearings were conducted during a six-month period. Not one of the 19, i.e., 
0%, was found competent.); Steven K. Hoge et al., The Right to Refuse Treatment Under 
Rogers v. Commissioner: Preliminary Empirical Findings and Comparisons, 15 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163, 164-65 (1987) (A study of all 350 competency 
hearings conducted in Massachusetts during a 17-month period revealed that only 12 
patients, i.e., 3.4%, were found competent.); Miller et al., supra note 11, at 110-11, 115 
(Of the 272 patients who were either confined in a maximum security state forensic 
facility at the time the competency hearing requirement was implemented or who were 
admitted to that facility within six months, 39 competency hearings were conducted. 
Not one of the 39, i.e., 0%, was found competent.); Sauvayre, supra note 11, at 222-23 
(A study of all patient refusals resulting in court hearings at a maximum security 
forensic hospital revealed that 40 competency hearings were conducted on 33 patients 
during a two-year period. In only eight cases, i.e., 20% of the hearings, were patients 
found competent.); Schouten & Gutheil, supra note 11, at 1348-49 ( A study of all 2216 
competency hearings conducted in Massachusetts during an 18-month period revealed 
that only 21 patients, i.e., 0.9%, were found competent.); Jorge Veliz & William S. 
James, Medicine Court: Rogers in Practice, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 63-64 (1987) 
(A study of a strict-security facility for criminally insane men revealed that 39 
competency hearings were conducted during a one-year period. Only four patients, i.e., 
10.3%, were found competent.); Zito, New York Under Rivers, supra note 11, at 905-06 
(A study of all New York state adult psychiatric and forensic facilities revealed that for 
the 49,408 patients admitted, 358 competency hearings were conducted during a one-year 
period. Only 32 patients, i.e., 8.9%, were found competent.); Zito, One Year Under 
Rivers, supra note 11, at 297-98, 300 (A study of a large state psychiatric facility 
revealed that for the 2328 patients in residence at the start of the study or admitted 
during the study, 15 competency hearings were conducted during a one-year period. 
Only two patients, i.e., 13.3%, were found competent.). 
In jurisdictions that use a medical decisionmaker review model, most refusals of 
treatment are overridden and most patients are treated involuntarily. See Paul S. 
Appelbaum & Steven K. Hoge, The Right to Refuse Treatment: What the Research 
Reveals, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 279, 288-90 (1986) (discussing studies). 
80. See, e.g., Binder & McNiel, supra note 11, at 353-54, 357 (Court decisions do 
not take into account the realities of severe mental disorder and the benefits of 
psychotropic medication. Patients receive inappropriate or incomplete treatment when 
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few studies, the researchers state the doctors' reasons for recommending 
treatment over their patients' objections81 and/or the patients' reasons 
they are found competent to refuse treatment. Additionally, in some situations, doctors 
may not even contest a patient's medication refusal if they believe the patient will be 
found competent at a hearing.); Ciccone et al., supra note 11, at 210-11 (Court hearings 
required an average of 31 days to resolve at the private hospital and 68 days to resolve 
at the public hospital. The legal expense to the private hospital is over $2000 per 
hearing. Two clinicians and an ethicist, who reviewed patient charts at the public 
hospital, found no patients who benefited from the hearing requirement.); Cournos et al., 
supra note 11, at 855 (Court hearings are costly and require staff time. Judges almost 
always defer to physicians to make treatment decisions.); DeLand & Borenstein, supra 
note 11, at 41 (Each competency hearing required approximately six hours of a 
psychiatrist's time, and each psychiatrist interviewed expressed the belief that the 
physician-patient relationship was adversely affected by the hearing process.); 
Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 38-41 (Judicial review significantly delayed the beginning 
of treatment for patients found incompetent-an average of 80 additional days. The 
financial impact of holding patients for 80 days without treatment is enormous.); Hoge 
et al., supra note 11, at 955-56 (Delay in preparing petitions and awaiting judicial 
hearings prolonged hospitalization, increased patient morbidity, increased the number of 
patient assaults and disruption of the therapeutic milieu, and diverted clinical staff time.); 
Hoge et al., supra note 79, at 168 {The cost of 350 hearings was estimated at $1 million 
including the time of the judge, lawyers, and doctors.); Miller et al., supra note 11, at 
1 I 5-17 ( Costs of hearings include delays in treatment and staff time required for 
hearings. The willingness of courts to accept telephone testimony eliminated staff travel 
time and time waiting in court for the case to be called.); Schouten & Gutheil, supra 
note 11, at 1349-51 (In fiscal year 1985, the legislature appropriated $364,000 and in 
fiscal year 1986, the legislature appropriated an additional $824,000 to fund the 
personnel costs of conducting hearings. Noneconomic costs include damage to the 
therapeutic relationship and the suffering of patients when treatment is delayed. Delays 
of 8 to 10 weeks were common.); Veliz & James, supra note 79, at 63-66 (Court 
hearings are extremely time-consuming and cumbersome. The waiting period between 
petitioning for a hearing and the hearing itself averaged 4.5 months. Each hearing 
requires an enormous investment of professional time.); Zito, New York Under Rivers, 
supra note 11, at 907-08 (The court-review procedure reduces the likelihood of achieving 
the clinical goal of compliance with psychotropic medication regimens. Court hearings 
are inefficient; the delay in scheduling and holding hearings averaged slightly more than 
one month. When patients were found incompetent, courts simply agreed with requested 
medication orders, failing to tailor therapy narrowly to individual patients' clinical 
needs.); Zito, One Year Under Rivers, supra note 11, at 300 {The median time from a 
request for a court hearing to a court decision was 35 days.). 
81. See, e.g., Cournos et al., supra note 11, at 853-54 {The primary reasons for 
requesting treatment were severe mental illness with regression in 33% of the cases, 
severe mental illness without regression in 29% of the cases, and serious untreated 
medical illness in 10% of the cases.); DeLand & Borenstein, supra note 11, at 41 
(Psychiatrists testified that patients were incompetent because the patients denied their 
illnesses, were unable to recognize the benefits of the medication or the dangers of 
refusing treatment, or were so delusional and disorganized that they could not make 
rational judgments about the medication.); Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 951 (When 
asked to identify patients' reasons for refusing medication, physicians identified 
psychotic or idiosyncratic reasons in 49% of the cases; transferential problems, anger 
toward the clinician, or other interpersonal issues in 11 % of the cases; and side effects 
of medication in 7% of the cases.); Veliz & James, supra note 79, at 64 (Psychiatrists 
testified that patients lacked competence for the following reasons: the patient is not 
rational because of his mental illness, the patient becomes psychotic and violent when 
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for refusing treatment.82 In these studies, the researchers either report 
their own assessment of patient reasons for refusal, 83 or fail to identify 
he does not take medication, the patient does not acknowledge his mental illness, or the 
patient does not understand the benefits of medication.); Zito, One Year Under Rivers, 
supra note 11, at 299 (Psychiatrists requesting competency hearings targeted the 
following symptoms for treatment with medication: violence/assaultiveness in 40% of 
the cases; refusal to eat in 20% of the cases; schizophrenic symptoms such as delusions, 
hallucinations, and disordered thinking in I 0% of the cases; refusal of medical treatment 
in 10% of the cases; and depression/suicide risk in 10% of the cases.). 
82. See, e.g., Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 951 (After interviewing patients who 
refused medication, researchers characterized patients' reasons as follows: 35% refused 
because of side effects from the medication, 30% refused for reasons that overtly 
reflected psychotic or idiosyncratic thought processes, 21 % denied being mentally ill, 
and 12% claimed the medication was ineffective.); Miller et al., supra note 11, at 111 
(Of 91 patients who refused medication, the reasons for refusal included denial of illness 
in 69.2% of the cases, assertion of legal rights in 26.4% of the cases, complaints about 
side effects in 15.4% of the cases, use of medication refusal as a bargaining tool with 
staff over other issues in 7.7% of the cases, too disorganized to refuse or consent in 
3.3% of the cases, assertion that medication had not helped in the past in 1.1 % of the 
cases, and assertion that patient didn't want the medication in 1.1 % of the cases.); Zito, 
One Year Under Rivers, supra note 11, at 299-300 (As recorded by the treating 
psychiatrists, patients refused treatment for the following reasons: paranoid belief that 
the medication was poisonous in 35% of the cases; denial of the need for medication and 
the belief that they were not mentally ill in 25% of the cases; side effects from previous 
administration of medication such as acute dystonic reaction, dry mouth, and 
sleeplessness in 10% of the cases; unconfirmed religious restrictions in 10% of the cases; 
no reason offered in 15% of the cases.). See also Schwartz et al., supra note 11, at 
1050, 1052 (During a four-month study period, researchers identified 25 patients on two 
inpatient psychiatric units of a university-affiliated hospital who had been involuntarily 
treated in a medical emergency or as a result of a court order. At discharge, 24 of these 
patients were asked why they had refused treatment. Patients denied the need for 
medication in 33.3% of the cases, were severely confused or exhibited psychotic ideation 
in 29.2% of the cases, expressed concerns about side effects in 20.8% of the cases, and 
gave no reason or did not know in 16. 7% of the cases.). 
Some researchers have studied reasons for patients' refusal of psychotropic medication 
unrelated to whether the refusals resulted in court hearings of the patients' competence 
or other reviews of their decisions. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With 
Their Rights On", supra note 5, at 310-11; Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 79, at 284-
86 (discussing studies). 
83. See, e.g., Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 950 (Researchers interviewed patients.); 
Schwartz et al., supra note 11, at 1052 (Researchers interviewed patients.); Zito, One 
Year Under Rivers, supra note 11, at 299-300 (Treating psychiatrists recorded patients' 
reasons for refusing treatment. Researchers then classified the reasons as meritorious or 
nonmeritorious. Although illness-based reasons were considered nonmeritorious, a self-
reported depression was categorized as meritorious. Unconfirmed religious restrictions 
were categorized as nonmeritorious.). 
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the source of the stated reasons. 84 When researchers characterize 
patients' reasons, biased reporting is a significant possibility.85 
Since 1990, I have served as a law-trained decisionmaker in hearings 
to determine mental patients' competence to refuse psychotropic 
medication. Each hearing was electronically recorded, and I wrote a 
case report within a few hours after each hearing was completed. A case 
report contains: statistical data on the patient; summaries of the facility 
representative's testimony, the cross-examination by the public defender, 
and the patient's testimony; my decision and the reasons for my 
decision; and any additional observations that I considered noteworthy. 
This article reports on, and analyzes, my experience. Thus, unlike other 
empirical studies, this article focuses on the evidence presented in each 
hearing, the judgment of the decisionmaker, and the decisionmaker's 
perspective on the process itself. 
In Part II, I discuss the California court decision imposing a judicial 
hearing requirement, San Diego Superior Court rules implementing the 
decision, and legislation codifying the hearing requirement but modifying 
procedural safeguards. In Part III, I present and analyze data on the 
competency cases I decided, focusing on factors that may have affected 
my decisionmaking. I also compare my hearing results with those of 
other decisionmakers. I discuss attitudinal problems of treating 
physicians in relating to patients as autonomous human beings, in 
understanding and accepting the legal requirement of informed consent, 
and in cooperating with and participating in the competency hearing 
process. Generally, these problems are not statistically quantifiable. 
However, they do impact the hearings by altering the evidence available 
to the decisionmaker. In my judgment, they also support a policy 
judgment requiring that competency hearings be conducted by law-
trained decisionmakers. In Part IV, I suggest how this model may be 
implemented without undue cost or burden. I caution, however, that 
although these hearings will provide due process for patients who 
participate in them, they will provide only the illusion of due process for 
patients who do not. Appropriate measures are needed to assure that 
consent obtained from competent patients is truly voluntary and 
informed. 
84. See Miller et al., supra note 11, at 111. The authors merely state the reasons 
for patients' refusals without attributing any source of those reasons. Some of the 
reasons presented, however, suggest that the source was not the patients themselves, but 
the assessment of patients' reasons by either the treating physicians or the researchers. 
For example, some patients were reported to use a "medication refusal as a bargaining 
tool with staff over issues unrelated to medication." Id. Other patients were 
characterized as "too disorganized to be considered competent to refuse or consent." Id. 
85. Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 79, at 285. 
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IL RIESE V. ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER:86 THE 
CASE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
In June, 1985, Eleanor Riese entered St. Mary's Hospital as a 
voluntary patient. Prior to this admission, she had been treated for 
chronic schizophrenia with Mellaril®,87 a psychotropic medication. As 
a result of that earlier treatment, her bladder had been severely 
damaged.88 Nevertheless, the treating doctor prescribed Mellaril®, and 
she consented to its use. Although she complained of dizziness and dry 
mouth and stated that she was receiving too much medication, the 
dosage was not reduced. When she protested and refused medication, 
she was forcibly injected and committed as an involuntary patient.89 
Ms. Riese brought a class action on behalf of patients involuntarily 
committed under California's seventy-two-hour treatment and evaluation 
detention90 or its fourteen-day intensive treatment certification.91 She 
sought a court order requiring that patients' informed consent be 
obtained before psychotropic mediation can be administered.92 
Although plaintiffs lost at the trial level, the California Court of 
Appeal reversed, upholding the patients' right to exercise informed 
consent in nonemergency situations.93 The court began its analysis by 
discussing the benefits and detriments of psychotropic medication. The 
court acknowledged that psychotropic medications "are the principal and 
single most effective treatment" for acute psychosis.94 Properly used, 
the primary effect of psychotropic medications is a normalizing one, 
86. 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Ct. App. 1987), review granted, 751 P.2d 893, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 627 (Cal. 1988), review dismissed and court of appeal opinion ordered published, 
774 P.2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669 (Cal. 1989), 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271 Cal. Rptr. 
199 (1987)(republished opinion). 
87. Mellaril® is the Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation brand of thioridazine 
HCL. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2168 (49th ed. 1995). 
88. Ms. Riese died on April 6, 1991. She was 47 years old. Although no autopsy 
was performed, her death was attributed to renal failure resulting from the cumulative 
effects of medication she. had received over her lifetime. Telephone Interview with 
Colette Hughes, Protection and Advocacy, Inc., co-counsel for Eleanor Riese in Riese 
v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr. (July 11, 1994). 
89. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1308-09, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02. 
90. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5150 (West 1984). 
91. Id. § 5250 (West Supp. 1995). 
92. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1308, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 201. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1310, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203. 
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alleviating symptoms by restoring the brain's chemical balance. The 
medications do not brainwash the patient by creating new thoughts or 
ideas or by permanently inhibiting thought generation.95 Nevertheless, 
these powerful drugs act upon thought processes and are in that sense 
"mind altering."96 Further, psychotropic medications are not always 
used properly. Abuses have been documented, especially in understaffed 
and underfunded public mental hospitals.97 Psychotropic medications 
also produce adverse side effects,98 which the court characterized as 
"equally well recognized" as "their universally accepted bene:fits."99 · 
Many of these side effects are reversible when the medication is 
terminated or given at a reduced dosage, but one, tardive dyskinesia, is 
an irreversible neurological disorder. In its most progressed state, 
tardive dyskinesia interferes with all of the patient's motor activity. 100 
Turning to the plaintiffs' claim, the court discussed and relied upon 
numerous statutory provisions to support the requirement of informed 
consent by involuntarily committed mental patients. 101 Although the 
court withheld judgment on whether constitutional bases also support 
informed consent in this context, 102 it noted that the right of persons 
not adjudicated incompetent to give or withhold consent to medical 
95. Id. (discussing Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On", supra 
note 5, at 308); see also Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control, " 
"Synthetic Sanity, " "Artificial Competence, " and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant 
Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983). "Available 
evidence suggests . . . that [psychotropic] medications lack the subtle, deleterious effects 
on mental functioning attributed to them .... " Id. at 119. 
96. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Winick has argued 
that because psychotropic medications directly affect mental processes and intellectual 
functioning, their proposed administration over a patient's objection demands first 
amendment scrutiny. Winick, A First Amendment Perspective, supra note 9, at 69-80; 
Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Current State of the 
Law and Beyond, in A.B.A. COMM'N ON MENTALLY DISABLED, supra note 8, at 7, 9-12. 
97. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203. 
98. Winick has asserted that the label "side effects" is misleading and denigrates 
the impact of these undesirable consequences on patients. "Although these side effects 
are unintended, they are intrinsic to the drugs' benevolent properties and should not be 
trivialized, particularly since patients frequently experience them to be distressing enough 
to outweigb the drugs' positive clinical effects." Winick, A First Amendment 
Perspective, supra note 9, at 70. 
99. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203. 
100. Id. at 1311-12, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203-04. Tardive dyskinesia is."manifested 
by involuntary, rhythmic and grotesque movements of the face, mouth, tongue, jaw and 
extremities." Id. at 1311, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 203. Although the condition generally 
occurs after prolonged treatment with psychotropic medication, it can occasionally occur 
after only brief treatment. Id. at 1312, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 204. For a discussion of the 
temporary and permanent side effects of psychotropic medication, see Cichon, supra note 
9, at 297-310, and sources discussed therein. 
101. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1308, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 201. 
102. Id. 
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treatment103 is protected both by the common law and by the constitu-
tional right to privacy. 104 California courts uphold decisions by 
competent adults to refuse life-sustaining treatment.105 Logically, they 
cannot reject non-life threatening medication-refusal decisions by 
competent mental patients. 
If incompetence to make treatment decisions is a prerequisite for 
involuntary commitment, and if the incompetence adjudication is 
subsumed in the commitment decision, then involuntarily committed 
mental patients would not enjoy a right to refuse treatment.106 Califor-
nia statutes, however, do not so provide. Typically, the involuntary 
commitment process originates without any judicial oversight. A 
seventy-two-hour evaluation and treatment detention merely requires a 
probable cause belief by a peace officer or evaluation facility staff 
member that the person detained is, as result of mental disorder, either 
a danger to others, to himself or herself, or gravely disabled. 107 
Following a seventy-two-hour detention, the patient can be detained for 
fourteen days on an intensive treatment certification signed by a treating 
physician.108 An administrative hearing, conducted by a court-
appointed commissioner, referee, or certification review hearing officer, 
is statutorily mandated during that fourteen-day period. 109 The 
decisionmaker determines whether probable cause exists to believe that 
the commitment criteria are established but does not determine whether 
103. Because treatment with psychotropic medication profoundly affects mind and 
body in both intended and unintended ways, the court declared that the right to refuse 
psychotropic medication "clearly falls within the recognized right to refuse medical 
treatment." Id. at 1318, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 208 .
104. Id. at 1317-18, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 207-08. 
105 . Id. at 1317-18, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (discussing Bartling v. Superior Court, 
163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984)). 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27. 
107. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5150 (West 1984). "Gravely disabled" is defined 
as "[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide 
for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." Id. § 5008(h)(l)(A) 
(West Supp. 1995). 
108. Id. § 5250 (West Supp. 1995). A person who has been evaluated under a 72-
hour detention may be certified for 14 days of intensive treatment if the professional 
staff of the evaluating facility has found that the person is, as a result of mental disorder, 
either a danger to others, to•himself or herself, or gravely disabled. Id. 
109. Id. §§ 5254-5256.8. The. hearing is conducted within four days of the 
beginning of the intensive treatment certification. Id. § 5256. 
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the person certified is competent to refuse treatment. 110 Even if a 
mental health conservatorship is subsequently established for a gravely 
disabled patient, 111 the conservatorship does not, of itself, constitute an 
adjudication of incompetence. 112 A conservatee can be compelled to 
accept treatment to alleviate the condition of grave disability only if the 
conservatorship court authorizes the conservator to order such treat-
ment.113 Although the statute does not specifically require an adjudica-
tion of incompetence before the conservatee loses the right to refuse 
treatment, the Riese court noted that the conservatorship court must 
make the "appropriate findings" before authorizing the conservator to act 
as a surrogate decisionmaker. 114 
The Riese court cited five statutes that confirm the involuntarily 
committed patient's status as presumptively competent to give or 
withhold informed consent. 115 A statute that defines informed consent 
and prohibits coercion by physicians in obtaining consent also provides 
that a confined person is not to be deemed incapable of refusing 
treatment solely because he or she was diagnosed as mentally disor-
dered.116 Another statute declares: "No person may be presumed to be 
incompetent because he or she has been evaluated or treated for mental 
disorder . . . regardless of whether such evaluation or treatment was 
voluntarily or involuntarily received."117 Three other statutes identify 
the extent to which rights enjoyed by nonpatients are retained by 
involuntarily committed patients. One declares that mentally disordered 
persons "have the same legal rights and responsibilities guaranteed all 
110. Id. §§ 5256.5 (West 1984), 5256.6 (West Supp. 1995). I have reported on my 
experience as a certification review hearing officer. Grant H. Morris, Civil Commitment 
Decisionmaking: A Report on One Decisionmaker's Experience, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
291 (1988). 
111. For a critique of California mental health conservatorship law and the process 
by which conservatorships are established, see Grant H. Morris, Conservatorship for the 
"Gravely Disabled": California's Nondeclaration of Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 201 (1978). 
112. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1313, 271 
Cal. Rptr. 199, 204 (1987) (republished opinion); see also Conservatorship of Moore, 
185 Cal. App. 3d 718, 732, 229 Cal. Rptr. 875, 884 (1986) ("[C]onservatees are not, by 
reason of their conservatorship, automatically considered incompetent .... "). 
113. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE§ 5358(b) (West Supp. 1995). 
114. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1313, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 204. 
115. Id. at 1313-17, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 205-07. 
116. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE§ 5326.S(d) (West 1984). Although the decision 
in Riese was unanimous, one justice wrote a concurring opinion to express his belief that 
this statute should serve as the sole basis for the court's decision. A discussion of other 
statutes was said to be scholarly and interesting but unnecessary to the decision and to 
the narrow statutory basis upon which it rests. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1324-25, 271 
Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Benson, J., concurring). 
117. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE§ 5331 (West 1984). 
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other persons by the Federal Constitution and laws, and the Constitution 
and laws of the State of California unless specifically limited by federal 
or state law or regulations."118 The other two declare that involuntarily 
committed patients shall retain all rights119 and shall not forfeit any 
rights120 unless specifically stated to the contrary in the statutes. The 
court rejected the hospital's argument that the legislature's failure to 
articulate an explicit right to refuse psychotropic medication was 
intended to exclude such right: "[T]hroughout the statutory scheme the 
Legislature repeatedly admonishes that the failure . . . to explicitly 
confer a particular right upon mentally [ disordered] persons cannot 
provide a basis upon which to deny it. "121 
The court also rejected the hospital's argument that if the right to 
refuse treatment exists, the court's role is merely to assure that 
professional judgment has been exercised in the decision to medicate 
patients. 122 Rather, the Riese court declared that the role of the court 
is to determine whether the patient is competent to refuse medication 
despite his or her mental disorder. Quoting the New York Court of 
Appeals, the Riese court asserted that the determination of competence 
to refuse medication "is uniquely a judicial, not a medical function."123 
California statutes provide for an evidentiary hearing whenever a 
mental patient's competence to consent to convulsive therapy is in 
question.124 Appellate courts interpreting those statutes require that the 
patient's incapacity be established by clear and convincing evidence. 125 
The Riese court held that the statutory provisions governing the 
determination of the patient's competence to consent to convulsive 
118. Id. § 5325.1. 
119. Id. § 5327. 
120. Id. § 5005. 
121. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1316-17, 
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 207 (1987) (republished opinion). 
122. Id. at 1320-21, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 210. 
123. Id. at 1321, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (quoting Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485,496, 
495 N.E.2d 337, 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 80 (1986)). 
124. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.7 (West 1984). 
125. Conservatorship of Waltz, 180 Cal. App. 3d 722,733,227 Cal. Rptr. 436,442 
(1986); Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 314,324,206 Cal. Rptr. 603,609 
(1984). In Lillian F., the court noted that although the state has an interest in insuring 
appropriate treatment for those who are incapable of understanding its benefit, "[i]t has 
an equal interest in insuring that such a serious and intrusive procedure is not forced on 
a [patient] who does not want it and who is simply in disagreement with his [or her] 
physicians." Lillian F., 160 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 608. 
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therapy were equally appropriate to a determination of the patient's 
competence to refuse psychotropic medication.126 Specifically, the 
Riese court imposed a requirement that the patient's incapacity to refuse 
medication be established by proof that is clear and convincing. 127 
Borrowing liberally from a text for psychiatrists prepared by Thomas 
Gutheil, M.D., and Paul Appelbaum, M.D.,128 the Riese court identified 
three factors that judges should consider in assessing the competence of 
a patient's medication refusal. First, the judge should consider "whether 
the patient is aware of his or her situation."129 The court offered one 
example of such awareness: If the judge believes that the patient is 
psychotic, does the patient acknowledge the psychosis?130 The court's 
singular example seems unfortunate. Doctors often assume that patients 
who do not acknowledge their disorder are unable to appreciate the 
benefits of medication to treat that disorder and are, therefore, incompe-
126. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211. 
127. Id. 
128. THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 219-20 (1982). Subsequent to the Riese decision, this book 
was revised. In the revised edition, standards for specific competence appear at pages 
221-23. PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 221-23 (2d ed. 1991). For other discussions of competency 
assessment factors and "tests" of competency, see Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, 
Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 
1635-36 (1988) (Competence involves four related skills: to communicate choices, to 
understand relevant information, to appreciate the situation and its consequences, and to 
manipulate information rationally.); Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Mentally Ill 
and Non-Mentally-Ill Patients' Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclosures for 
Medication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 377,378 (1991) (Study was conducted measuring 
ability to understand information relevant for decision making about medication.); Loren 
H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
279, 280-82 (1977) (Tests of competency fall into 5 categories: evidencing a choice, 
making a "reasonable" choice, making a choice based on "rational" reasons, ability to 
understand, and actual understanding); Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotrop-
ic Medication: Three Alternatives to the Law's Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 689, 691-93, 757-58 (1993) (This article discusses three noncognitive standards for 
judging competency: a "different person" standard, a "volitional impairment" standard, 
and a "product of mental illness" standard. The author concludes that the law's 
treatment competency standard, which focuses on cognition, is superior.); Elyn R. Saks, 
Competency to Refase Treatment, 69 N.C. L. REV. 945, 949-50 (1991) (A competency 
standard must: identify the abilities that are necessary to making decisions that deserve 
deference, protect a person's expression of unconventional values and beliefs, and 
designate as incompetent a reasonably small class of individuals who are under the 
pervasive influence of the irrational and the unconscious.). For a more comprehensive 
listing of legal and mental health professional literature addressing competency to make 
treatment decisions, see id. at 948 n.9. 
129. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211. 
130. Id. 
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tent. 131 Although denial of mental disorder may be a factor in assess-
ing a person's awareness of the situation, it is certainly not the exclusive 
measure. Even if a person denies having a mental disorder, he or she 
is aware of the situation if the person knows that he or she is involun-
tarily confined in a mental hospital, that the doctors have diagnosed the 
person as having a mental disorder, that the doctors have prescribed 
psychotropic medication to treat the disorder, that the doctors believe the 
medication will benefit the person by relieving symptoms, and that the 
person is refusing the medication because of concern about medication 
side effects that have been previously experienced. 
Second, the judge should consider "whether the patient is able to 
understand the benefits and the risks of, as well as the alternatives to, the 
proposed intervention."132 Here, too, the Riese court gave an example. 
Even if the patient is acutely psychotic, the patient should understand 
that dystonic reactions are a risk, that resolution of the psychotic episode 
is a benefit, and that psychotherapy, milieu therapy and possibly 
electroconvulsive therapy are alternatives. 133 This example, suggested 
by Drs. Gutheil and Appelbaum, 134 appears helpful. Nevertheless, one 
can question whether treating physicians even consider the suggested 
alternative therapies as viable substitutes for psychotropic medication. 
The Riese court admitted, for example, that electroconvulsive therapy is 
almost never prescribed during the seventy-two-hour and fourteen-day 
treatment periods. 135 
Third, the judge should assess the patient's ability "to understand and 
to knowingly and intelligently evaluate the information required to be 
given patients whose informed consent is sought (§ 5326.2) and 
otherwise participate in the treatment decision by means of rational 
thought processes."136 The court cited with approval a suggestion 
offered by Drs. Gutheil and Appelbaum that the patient should be 
assumed to be utilizing rational thought processes in the absence of 
131. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 128, at 219 ("Patients who are required 
to make a decision about psychiatric treatment but who deny the existence of a psychotic 
state or of their severe depression cannot be considered to be competent to decide about 
means of ameliorating their condition."). 
132. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211. 
133. Id. at 1322-23, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211-12. 
134. GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 128, at 219. 
135. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1323 n.17, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212 n.17. 
136. Id. at 1323, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212. 
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proof clearly linking delusional or hallucinatory perceptions to the 
individual's ultimate decision. 137 
An assessment of a patient's ability to understand information begins 
with the information that the patient has been given. Although the Riese 
court did not itself discuss what information must be provided, it 
incorporated, by specific reference, California Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 5326.2. That statute itemizes information that must be 
given to the patient in a· clear and explicit manner· in order to obtain a 
voluntary informed consent.· Among the required disclosures are: (1) the 
nature and seriousness of the patient's mental disorder that serves as a 
reason for treatment; (2) the nature of the proposed treatment, including 
probable frequency and duration; (3) the degree and duration of 
improvement or remission anticipated with or without such treatment; ( 4) 
the nature, degree, duration, and the probability of side effects and 
significant risks of the proposed treatment and how and to what extent 
they may be controlled, if at al1; 138 (5) the reasonable alternative 
treatments, and why the physician is recommending this particular 
treatment; and (6) that the patient has the right to accept or refuse the 
proposed treatment, and that if the patient consents, he or she has the 
right to revoke the consent for any reason and at any time prior to or 
between treatments.139 
After discussing the competency assessment factors, the Riese court 
considered the results of the adjudicatory process. If the patient is found 
competent to give informed consent and refuses to do so, the patient 
may not be medicated involuntarily.140 If the patient is found incom-
petent to give informed consent, and the patient is being detained on a 
seventy-two-hour or fourteen-day treatment hold, the patient may be 
required to accept psychotropic. medication that has been medically 
prescribed.141 The doctor is empowered to impose treatment without 
137. Id. (citing GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 128, at 220). 
138. Because tardive dyskinesia is a known, significant side effect of psychotropic 
medication, its risk must be disclosed. The statutory requirement precludes the 
suggestion of Drs. Gutheil and Appelbaum that information about tardive dyskinesia 
should be withheld by doctors until the acute episode of their patients' mental disorders 
has been resolved. See GUTHEIL & APPELBAUM, supra note 128, at 219 .
139. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 5326.2 (West 1984). This statute was enacted 
in 197 6 as one of several statutes designed to place limitations on the use of psychosur-
gery and convulsive therapies. Act of Sept. 20, 1976, ch. 1109, § 3.5, 1976 Cal. Stat. 
4992, 4994-95. Thus, the statute contains some disclosure requirements that are 
particularly applicable to those treatments. For example, disclosure is required of: (1) 
the probability and duration of memory loss, including its irreversibility, and (2) the 
division of opinion that exists regarding the efficacy of the proposed treatment. Id. 
140. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212. 
141. Id. 
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obtaining the approval of a court, guardian, or other surrogate 
decisionmaker. If the incompetent patient has been placed on a mental 
health conservatorship in which the conservator may authorize the 
patient's confinement and treatment for renewable periods of one 
year,142 consent must be obtained· from the patient's conservator.143 
The court noted that surrogate decisionmakers should attempt to 
ascertain the choice the patient would have made if the patient were 
competent, 144 and if it is not possible to do so, the surrogate should be 
guided in the decision by the patient's best interests.145 
The Riese court's refusal to require a surrogate decisionmaker for 
incompetent patients on seventy-two-hour or fourteen-day treatment 
holds is surprising. In other states, courts have required not only a 
judicial determination of the patient's competence, but also, a 
judge's146 or guardian's approval147 before treatment may be imposed 
142. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5358 (West Supp. 1995), 5361 (West 1984). 
143. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1323, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212. 
144. Id. (quoting Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. 
Rptr. 484, 493 (1983)). For example, the patient's concerns about medication side 
effects may have been expressed before the patient became incompetent: 
145. Id. 
146. See, e.g., People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973-74 (Colo. 1985) ("If the court 
is convinced of the patient's mental incompetency, it must then determine whether the 
proposed treatment is necessary either to prevent a significant and likely long-term 
deterioration in the patient's mental condition or to prevent the likelihood of the patient 
causing serious harm to himself or others in the institution." If less intrusive alternatives 
to psychotropic medication are available, nonconsensual treatment should be denied.); 
In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750 (D.C. 1979) ("The court, as surrogate for the 
incompetent, is to determine as best it can what choice that individual, if competent, 
would make with respect to medical procedures."); Rogers v. Commissioner ofDep't of 
Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 504, 458 N.E.2d 308, 318 (1983) ("We conclude that, 
if a patient is declared incompetent, a court must make the original substituted judgment 
treatment decision and should approve a substituted judgment treatment plan. . . . The 
judge may delegate to a guardian the power to monitor the treatment process to ensure 
that the substituted judgment treatment plan is followed."); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 
485, 497-98, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986) ("If ... the court 
concludes that the patient lacks the capacity to determine the course of his own 
treatment, the court must determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored 
to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest, taking into consideration all 
relevant circumstances, including the patient's best interests, the benefits to be gained 
from the treatment, the adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any less 
intrusive alternative treatments."). 
Research discloses, however, that judges who find patients incompetent almost always 
find that they would choose to accept medication if they were competent to decide. 
Veliz & James, supra note 79, at 64. The substituted judgment requirement has not been 
an effective barrier to coerced treatment of incompetent patients. 
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on an incompetent patient. 148 Those courts have not distinguished 
between incompetent patients on short-term treatment holds and those on 
longer-term or indefinite treatment holds. To support the requirement of 
judicial determinations of competence, the Riese court noted that "the 
forcible administration of powerful mind altering drugs ... involves 
moral and ethical considerations not solely within the purview of the 
medical profession."149 Nevertheless, the Riese court was unwilling to 
consider whether those moral and ethical considerations are equally 
applicable to medication decisions for incompetent patients and should 
also require court oversight. Without extensive discussion, the Riese 
court merely instructed competency court judges not to decide medical 
questions, such as whether the prescribed medication was really needed 
or was the least drastic therapy available.150 As previously dis-
cussed, 151 the Supreme Court's decision in Riggins may well necessi-
tate judicial consideration of less intrusive alternatives to psychotropic 
medication for all mental patients, whether competent or incompetent. 
In 1988, the California Supreme Court granted review of the Riese 
court of appeal decision. 152 A year later, the California Supreme Court 
dismissed the review, remanded the case, and ordered the court of appeal 
decision published. 153 The court of appeal decision was republished 
in 1990.154 
In response to the Riese decision, courts throughout California began 
conducting competency hearings. On March 1, 1990, the San Diego 
County Superior Court promulgated court rules establishing procedures 
to implement the Riese hearing requirements. 155 The court rules 
147. See, e.g., In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747, 751-52 (Okla. 1980) ("[I]nvoluntary 
treatment would require instigation of a judicial proceeding to have [the patient] declared 
legally incompetent and appointment of a guardian to make an informed decision for 
her."). 
148. The Riese court specifically declined to follow the procedures for incompetent 
patients utilized in other states. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322 n.16, 271 Cal. Rptr. 
at 211 n. 16. 
149. Id. at 1324, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13. 
ISO. Id. at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211. 
151. See supra text accompanying notes 58-72. 
152. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 751 P.2d 893,245 Cal. Rptr. 627 
(Cal. 1988). 
153. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 774 P.2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669 
(Cal. 1989). 
154. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 271 Cal. 
Rptr. 199 (1987). Although the republished opinion uses the date of the opinion as 
originally issued, the republication occurred in a West advance sheet dated August 10, 
1990. 271 Cal. Rptr. No. 2 (August IO, 1990). 
155. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. Rs. 2.124-.142 (The rules are titled "Determination of 
Capacity of Mental• Health Patient to Give or Withhold Informed Consent to Administra-
tion of Antipsychotic Medication."). 
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require competency hearings for treatment-refusing patients who are 
detained on seventy-two-hour holds, fourteen-day holds, and temporary 
conservatorships. 156 The decision to include persons on temporary 
conservatorships is warranted. In establishing a temporary conservator-
ship, the court determines whether the patient is able to provide for food, 
clothing, and shelter, not whether the patient is competent to refuse 
medication. 157 Additionally, temporary conservatorships are estab-
lished upon the ex parte judgment of the court. No adversarial hearing 
is conducted on any issue. 1 8 A separate Riese hearing is needed to 
provide temporary conservatees with their day in court on the treatment 
competency issue. 
The court rules require competency hearings for patients in public and 
private hospitals.159 This clarification seems appropriate. Although 
the Riese defendant was a private facility, the Riese court did not 
specifically limit its decision to patients in private facilities. As 
authority for its decision, the court relied upon statutes that were equally 
applicable to patients in private and public facilities. 
In Riese, the court required a judicial determination of the patient's 
incompetence before psychotropic medication can be administered 
without informed consent. Riese, however, involved patients in 
nonemergency situations. 160 A California statute authorizes the denial 
of a patient's rights "for good cause" and requires the Director of Mental 
Health to "adopt regulations specifying the conditions under which [a 
patient's rights] may be denied."161 .The regulation promulgated 
pursuant to that statute permits the physician to take appropriate action 
in an emergency-including the administration of antipsychotic 
medication. 162 The regulation narrowly defines the situations in which 
156. Id. R. 2.124. 
157. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5352.1 (Westl984). 
158. Id. § 5352.1. A temporary conservatorship expires when the court conducts 
a hearing on the conservatorship petition or after 30 days if a conservatorship hearing 
has not been conducted prior to that time. If the proposed conservatee demands a court 
or jury trial on the issue of grave disability, the temporary conservatorship may be 
extended until the issue is decided, but not longer than six months. Id. 
159. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. R. 2.124. 
160. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1308, 271 
Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (1987) (republished opinion). 
161. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326 (West 1984). 
162. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 853 (1995). If psychotropic medication is 
administered in an emergency, its administration is limited to "that which is required to 
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a Riese hearing is not required: "An emergency exists when there is a 
sudden marked change in the patient's condition so that action is 
immediately necessary for the preservation of the life or the prevention 
of serious bodily harm to the patient or others, and it is impracticable to 
first obtain consent."163 The term "antipsychotic medication" is 
defined broadly to include all psychotropic medication used to treat 
either psychotic or nonpsychotic symptoms of any serious mental 
disorder. 164 The court rules repeat those definitions and interpret Riese 
to impose a judicial hearing requirement only in nonemergency 
situations. 165 
The court rules provide for the treating physician to initiate the 
hearing process by petitioning the court for a judicial determination of 
the patient's capacity to give or withhold informed consent. 166 When-
ever possible, the hearing is calendared within two court days. 167 
Under the rules, the superior court appoints court commissioners who act 
as judges pro tern to conduct the evidentiary hearings. 168 At each 
hearing, a request is made to the parties to stipulate to the court 
commissioner's designation as judge pro tern for all Riese hearing 
purposes. If the parties stipulate, then the court commissioner is 
empowered to make all :findings, conclusions, decisions, and orders in 
the matter. If the parties do not stipulate, the hearing is set before the 
superior court judge, who calendars the hearing within one court day of 
the originally set date, whenever possible.169 
treat the emergency condition." Id. 
The statute authorizing a 72-hour detention of dangerous or gravely disabled persons 
without any court involvement is regarded by commentators as an emergency detention. 
See, e.g., SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 101 {3d 
ed. 1985); lngo Keilitz et al., A Study of Involuntary Civil Commitment in Los Angeles 
County, 14 Sw. U. L. REV. 238, 247-49 (1984); Robert T. Roth et al., Into the Abyss: 
Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
400, 412 n.42 (1973). However, the "emergency" authorizing such detention is not the 
"emergency" authorizing involuntary treatment without a Riese hearing. 
163. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 853 {1995). 
164. Id. § 856; see supra note 2. 
165. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. R. 2.125. The Riese court also cited the definitions 
of "emergency" and "antipsychotic medication" promulgated in the administrative 
regulations. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1308 
n.2, 1310, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 n.2, 202 (1987) (republished opinion) (citing CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 9, §§ 853, 856 {1995)). 
166. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. R. 2.126. The treating physician is required to 
complete a document entitled "Petition and Declaration of Treating Physician Regarding 
Capacity to Give or Withhold Informed Consent." Id. R. 2.127. 
167. Id. R. 2.128. 
168. Id. R. 2.131. 
169. Id. R. 2.132. 
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The policy of using court commissioners as judges in Riese hearings 
is meritorious. It responds to the problem of delay frequently associated 
with the requirement of judicial hearings. 170 When court commission-
ers are used, treatment_ refusal cases do not have to be calendared onto 
already busy superior court dockets. Patients do not have to be 
transported to and from court. Doctors do not have to waste valuable 
time waiting for the case to.be called. Hearings can be held within two 
court days of their request. The hearings can be, and are required by the 
rules to be, held at the mental health facility where the patient is being 
detained.171 Because court commissioners decide the matter at the 
conclusion of the hearing, 172 treatment can be initiated immediately for 
those patients found incompetent. Thus, the use of court commissioners 
assures that the judicial system is not unduly burdened, that hearings are 
conducted without significant interruption in the daily routine of doctors 
or patients, and that cases can be decided and decisions implemented 
quickly. . 
The California Cons#tution empowers the legislature to provide for 
trial courts to appoint "commissioners to perform subordinate judicial 
duties."173 The legislature authorized court commissioners to serve as 
temporary judges when they are appointed for that purpose and "when 
otherwise qualified so to act."174 Court commissioners are required by 
statute to be citizens of the United States and residents of California. 
Courts may also impose a requirement that persons appointed as 
commissioners be lawyers who have been admitted to practice in the 
state. for a period of at least five years.175 . 
. In San Diego County, most of the court commissioners who conduct 
administrative hearings to determine whether probable cause exists to 
detain mental patients for fourteen days are not lawyers. Typically, their 
professional backgrounds are in various clinical disciplines including 
social work, rehabilitation counseling, and criminal justice administra-
170. See supra note 80. 
171. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. R. 2.135. The rule requires hearings to be held in 
surroundings that allow for quietness and a reasonable degree of confidentiality. Id. 
172. Id. R. 2.141. . 
173. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 22. 
174. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 259(e) (West Supp. 1995). 
175. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 70142 (West 1976). 
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tion.176 Are these court commissioners eligible to serve as temporary 
judges in competency hearings? 
The Riese court required a judicial, not an administrative, determina-
tion of the patient's competence.177 The decisionmaker must decide 
whether clear and convincing evidence establishes the patient's 
incapacity, 178 not merely whether probable cause exists to believe so. 
To carefully weigh the evidence in a Riese case, a legal education is a 
necessary prerequisite. While not all court commissioners need be 
lawyers, only those court commissioners who are lawyers are qualified 
to act as temporary judges.179 In San Diego County, the eight court 
commissioners appointed as temporary judges in competency hearings 
were attorneys. 180 
Ordinarily, court commissioners report their findings to the court 
which approves, rejects, or modifies them or conducts a hearing on 
exceptions. 181 If the parties stipulate that the court commissioner may 
act as a temporary judge, however, the court commissioner is empow-
ered to make a final determination of the case without any action or 
oversight by the court that appointed the commissioner. The request for 
the parties' stipulation, required by the court rules, confirms the "lawyers 
only" qualification for competency hearings. The California Constitution 
authorizes parties to stipulate to the trial and final determination of a 
matter "by a temporary judge who is a member of the State Bar."182 
The Public Defender represents the patient in the Riese hearing, unless 
the patient retains. his or her own attorney. 183 The physician and the 
176. Morris, supra note 110, at 335. 
177. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. &Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1308, 1320, 
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201, 210 (1987) (republished opinion). 
178. Id. at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211. 
179. See People v. Tijerina, 1 Cal. 3d 41, 49,459 P.2d 680,685, 81 Cal. Rptr. 264, 
269 (1969) (A court commissioner may not "act as a temporary judge if he is not 
otherwise qualified so to act.' "). 
180. Ironically, five of the eight were engaged in the private practice of law while 
serving as court commissioners, in apparent violation of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 70142 
(West 1976). At the time these individuals were appointed as court commissioners, the 
superior court knew of their qualifications and understood that they intended to continue 
their private practices while serving as court commissioners on an infrequent, as needed, 
basis. The statutory prohibition may have been intended to preclude only full-time 
commissioners from engaging in law practice, although the statute is not so limited in 
its wording. 
181. In re Edgar M., 14 Cal. 3d 727, 735, 537 P.2d 406, 412, 122 Cal. Rptr. 574, 
580 (1975); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 259(t) (West Supp. 1995). 
182. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21. Ironically, one individual appointed as a court 
commissioner/judge pro tern was not a member of the California Bar, although he was 
a member of a bar in another state. The court knew of his qualifications at the time he 
was appointed. 
183. SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. Rs. 2.129, 2.133. 
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mental health facility may be, but are not required to be, formally 
represented by counsel. 184 At the hearing, a facility representative 
presents the petition and declaration, and any oral or documented 
evidence. The facility representative must be a psychiatrist, psycholo-
gist, registered nurse, or social worker with at least a masters' de-
gree.185 The court.rules do not require the treating physician to testify, 
but they caution that the physician's absence may result in insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of the patient's mental incapacity. 186 
The rules provide for the patient's right to be present at the hearing and, 
through counsel, to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. 
The patient may, however, choose not to attend the hearing. 187 
The court rules repeat Riese's placement of a clear-and-convincing-
evidence burden on the facility18 and restate the three factors identi-
fied in Riese as the focus of a competency assessment. 189 In an 
apparent misreading of the first factor, however, the court rule directs the 
decisionmaker to consider the narrow issue of the patient's awareness of 
his or her mental condition, not the broader issue of the patient's 
awareness of his or her situation.190 
In addition to considering the evidence at the hearing, the judge pro 
tern is authorized by the court rules to consider the patient's relevant 
medical records. 191 At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge pro 
tern is required to make a determination of the patient's capacity to give 
or withhold informed consent.192 The rules provide for confidentiality 
of the proceedings and records of the proceedings.193 . 
In 1991, the California Legislature enacted statutes that codify, with 
some significant modifications, Riese's competency hearing require-
184. Id. R. 2.134. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. R. 2.138. 
188. Id. R. 2.136; see supra text accompanying notes 125-27. 
189. Id. R. 2.137; see supra text accompanying notes 128-39. 
190. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 129-31. 
191. Id. R. 2.139. 
192. Id. R. 2.141. 
193. Id. R. 2.142. The proceedings are declared to be confidential as provided in 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5328 (West Supp. 1995). The statute provides for 
confidentiality of "[a]ll information and records obtained in the course of providing 
services ... to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services . . . . " Id. 
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ment.194 The legislation declares that involuntarily committed mental 
patients195 have a right to refuse psychotropic medication. 196 Medi-
cation may be administered, however, to patients who do not exercise 
their right following disclosure of the right and of statutorily mandated 
information197 about the probable effects and possible side effects of 
the medication. 198 Although the legislation assures patients that they 
will receive information that will support their decision to refuse 
medication, for those patients who do not refuse, the legislation 
eliminates their right to exercise informed consent. Nonprotesting 
patients may be treated with psychotropic medication without giving a 
competent consent. The Riese court's reliance on a statutory basis to 
support an informed consent requirement is undermined by the 1991 
legislation. Whether constitutional guarantees of due process and equal 
protection will assure nonprotesting patients of no lesser informed 
consent right than other people remains undetermined. 199 
The legislation specifically provides that in an emergency, a protesting 
patient may be treated with antipsychotic medication that is necessary to 
treat the emergency condition.200 The legislature narrowly defined 
"emergency"201 and broadly defined "antipsychotic medication,"202 
194. Act of Oct. 7, 1991, ch. 681, 1991 Cal. Stat. (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE §§ 5008(1)-(m), 5325.2, 5332-5337 {West Supp. 1995)). 
195. The statute specifically includes persons detained for: 72 hours of evaluation 
and treatment without any court order pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 
(West 1984), 14 days of intensive treatment pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§ 5250 (West Supp. 1995), an additional 14 days of intensive treatment as an imminently 
suicidal person pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5260 (West 1984), or an 
additional 30 days of intensive treatment as a gravely disabled person pursuant to CAL. 
WELF.·& INST. CODE§ 5270.15 (West Supp. 1995). Ironically, the statute contains no 
reference to patients who are involuntarily committed for 72 hours of evaluation and 
treatment by court order pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5206 (West 1984) or 
patients who have been placed on a temporary conservatorship and are involuntarily 
committed for up to 30 days by their temporary conservator pursuant to CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 5353 (West 1984). The failure to include patients in these two categories 
is unwarranted. Patients in both categories are involuntarily committed without any 
hearing on the treatment competence issue. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58. 
196. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5325.2 {West Supp. 1995). The right to refuse 
medication is not absolute; it is subject to statutory limitations. Id. 
197. Id. §§ 5152(c), 5213(b). 
198. Id. § 5332(a). 
199. The Riese court relied upon statutes to declare a right of involuntary mental 
patients to exercise informed consent to the use of psychotropic medication. The court 
did not reach constitutional issues. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. 
App. 3d 1303, 1308, 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201 (1987) (republished opinion); see supra 
text accompanying notes 101-05. 
200. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(d) (West Supp. 1995). . 
201. Id. § 5008(m). Unlike CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 853 (1995), however, the 
statute does not impose a requirement that the necessity for immediate action be the 
result of a sudden marked change in the patient's condition. See supra text accompany-
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adopting definitions previously promulgated in the California Code of 
Regulations.203 When no emergency exists, medication may be 
administered to a protesting patient only if the treatment staff determines 
that alternatives to involuntary medication are unlikely to meet the 
treatment needs of the patient and the patient's incapacity to refuse 
treatment has been determined in a hearing.204 Throughout the 
legislation, the hearings are referred to as "capacity" hearings.205 
The hearing process is initiated by a petition filed with the superior 
court.206 The facility requesting the hearing is required to provide a 
written notice of its petition to the patient 207 and a mental health 
professional is required to inform the person of his or her capacity 
hearing rights.208 The legislation calls for capacity hearings to be held 
within twenty-four hours of the _petition's filing whenever possible. 
Hearings can be postponed for twenty-four hours if any party needs 
additional time to prepare. Hearings may also be postponed for an 
additional twenty-four hours in cases of hardship209 but must be held 
within seventy-two hours of the petition's filing.210 
By statute, capacity hearings may be conducted by a superior court 
judge or a court-appointed commissioner, referee, or hearing officer.211 
The superior court appoints commissioners, referees, and hearing officers 
from a list of attorneys unanimously approved by the local mental health 
director, the county public defender, and the county counsel or district 
ing note 163. 
202. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5008(1) (West Supp. 1995). 
203. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, §§ 853, 856 (1995). See supra text accompanying 
notes 160-65. 
204. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5332(b) (West Supp. 1995). 
205. Id. §§ 5332-5334, 5336. 
206. Id. § 5333(b). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. § 5333(c). The mental health professional is also required to answer any 
questions or concerns of the patient. Id. 
209. Id. § 5334(a). The statute does not define "hardship" but authorizes the county 
mental health director and the presiding judge of the superior court to develop a local 
policy regarding the scheduling of hearings. Id. 
210. Id. 
21 1 Id. § 5334(c). 
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attorney.212 Persons appointed as hearing officers are required to 
receive training on capacity hearings issues.213 
Capacity hearings are no longer judicial hearings; they are administra-
tive hearings. Although hearing officers must be lawyers, they serve as 
administrative decisionmakers not judicial decisionmakers. The patient 
is no longer entitled to representation by an attorney; he or she may be 
represented by a patients' rights advocate.214 Qualifications for 
individuals serving as patients' rights advocates are not specified in 
either the California statutes or the California Administrative Code.215 
Many patients' rights advocates are not attorneys.216 
California courts have not been called upon to determine whether an 
administrative capacity hearing satisfies constitutional requirements of 
due process. The requirement that hearing officers be attorneys and that 
appeals of hearing officer decisions be subject to de novo review by the 
superior court217 enhances the likelihood that the statute will be upheld 
if challenged. 
The statute requires that capacity hearings be conducted at the mental 
health facility where the patient is being detained.218 The use of 
hearing officers facilitates this requirement. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the decisionmaker is obligated to announce his or her decision, 
and as soon as practicable, to provide a written notification of the 
decision, including a statement of the evidence relied upon and the 
reasons for the decision.219 A determination of incapacity to refuse 
treatment remains in effect only for the duration of the seventy-two-hour 
212. Id. Employees of a county mental health program or mental treatment facility 
are not eligible to serve as hearing officers. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. § 5333(a). The statute provides the patient with a right to representation 
by either a patients' rights advocate or legal counsel. Id. 
215. The California Administrative Code identifies a "Patients' Advocate" as "the 
person in a local mental health program delegated the responsibility for ensuring that 
mentally disabled persons in facilities . . . are afforded their statutory and constitutional 
rights." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 863(b) (1995). 
216. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 110, at 326. In San Diego County certification 
review hearings, three of the five patients' advocates who assisted patients were not law 
trained. 
217. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5334(f) (West Supp. 1995). The person who is 
the subject of the capacity hearing is entitled to appeal the decision. Id. § 5334(e)(I). 
The person who petitioned for a capacity hearing may request the district attorney or 
county counsel to appeal the hearing decision. Id. § 5334(e)(2). The court of appeal 
hears appeals of superior court decisions; the superior court hears appeals of hearing 
officer decisions. Id. § 5334(e)(l-2). 
218. Id. § 5334(b). 
219. Id. § 5334(d). The written notification is submitted to the superior court and 
provided to the person who is the subject of the capacity hearing, the person's counsel 
or advocate, and the director of the facility. Id. 
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or fourteen-day detention, or both, unless the patient's capacity to refuse 
treatment has been restored prior to that time.220 
The capacity hearing legislation is silent on two important issues. 
First, the statutes establish no standard for measuring a patient's capacity 
to refuse treatment. Second, the statutes establish no burden of proof in 
capacity hearings. In the absence of a legislative decision to the 
contrary, the three capacity assessment factors identified in Riese should 
continue to be applied.221 Similarly, in the absence of a legislative 
decision to the contrary, the clear-and-convincing evidence burden 
announced in Riese should continue to be applied.222 The 1991 
legislation made some significant modifications to the Riese capacity 
hearing requirement. To the extent Riese was not modified, however, it 
remains the applicable law. 
The San Diego County Superior Court did not· amend its court rules 
to implement the statutory modifications. ·However, nine attorneys were 
appointed as mental health hearing officers, replacing the court 
commissioners who acted as judges pro tem.223 Because these hearing 
officers do not serve as temporary judges, the parties are not asked to 
stipulate to their designation. Hearing officers continue to impose a 
clear-and-convincing-evidence burden on the facility and to use the three 
competency assessment factors identified in Riese and repeated in the 
220. Id. § 5336. The statute specifically refers to "the detention period described 
in Section 5150 or 5250." This period is 72 hours for persons detained for evaluation 
and treatment without any court order (id. § 5150 (West 1984)) and 14 days for persons 
certified for intensive treatment (id. § 5250 (West Supp. 1995)). Imminently suicidal 
persons certified for an additional 14 days (id.§ 5260 (West 1984)) and gravely disabled 
persons certified for an additional 30 days (id. § 5270.15 (West Supp. 1995)) are also 
entitled to capacity hearings. Id. § 5332(b); see discussion supra note 195. Inexplica-
bly, the statute fails to prescribe how long incapacity determinations remain in effect for 
these patients. 
221. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1322-23, 
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 211-12 (1987) (republished opinion); see supra text accompanying 
notes 128-39. 
222. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211; see supra text 
accompanying note 127. 
223. Of the eight persons appointed in 1990 as court commissioners, five were 
appointed in 1991 as mental health hearing officers. Two court commissioners chose 
not to continue serving, and one did not receive the unanimous approval of the local 
mental health director, the county public defender, and county counsel required for 
appointment as a hearing officer. Four attorneys who had not served as court commis-
sioners were also appointed as mental health hearing officers, bringing the total to nine. 
Telephone Interview with William D. Miller, Director, Office of Counselor in Mental 
Health, San Diego County Superior Court (1992). 
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court rules. Although, by statute, patients are only entitled to representa-
tion by either a patient's rights advocate or an attomey,224 in San 
Diego County patients continue to be represented by public defender 
attorneys. 
III. ONE DECISIONMAKER'S EXPERIENCE: STATISTICAL DATA AND 
COMMENTARY 
In this portion of the article, I present and analyze data on the capacity 
hearings I conducted over a three-year period. From May 1990 through 
December 1991, I served as a court commissioner acting as a judge pro 
tern. During this time, forty-three hearings were calendared, of which 
thirty-three were heard and decided on the merits. Throughout the 
tables, I refer to these hearings as Group A. In January 1992, I began 
serving as a mental health hearing officer. From January 1992 through 
June 1993, thirty-four hearings were calendared of which thirty-three 
were heard and decided on the merits. Throughout the tables, I refer to 
these hearings as Group B. Thus, for each table, data are provided on 
an equal number of hearings conducted under the court rules implement-
ing the Riese decision and under the statutes enacted subsequently. Data 
are also presented on the combined Groups A and B. 
Number of hearings 
calendared 
Number of hearings 
decided on the 
merits 
Number of patients 
found competent 
Percent of patients 
found competent 
TABLE 1 









As reported in TABLE 1, I found 54.5 percent of Group A patients 
competent as compared with 27 .2 percent of Group B patients. Several 
224. CAL. WELF. & INST . CODE§ 5333(a) (West Supp. 1995). 
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factors may account for this disparity. First, in each hearing that I 
conducted, the facility was represented by a psychiatrist, psychologist, 
nurse, or social worker. None of these individuals was trained in law or 
had the assistance of an attorney during .the hearing. In contrast, the 
patient was represented by an attorney from the public defender's office 
in each hearing. These attorneys focused my attention on the narrow 
competency issue that was to be determined. 
With experience, facility representatives have acquired an adequate 
ability to present evidence of the patient's incompetence. However, in 
the :first few months in which hearings were conducted, facility 
representatives often were confused by the competency criteria. For 
example, in the very first case I heard, the psychiatrist's testimony 
focused on the patient's inability to provide food, clothing, and shelter. 
Obviously, she did not understand that the issue of grave disability is 
decided in a certification review hearing and _not a capacity hearing. The 
psychiatrist admitted in her written declaration that the patient was able 
to understand the risks and benefits of medication and to understand and 
evaluate information rationally regarding the proposed treatment and 
alternatives to that treatment.· The psychiatrist's sole basis for asserting 
the patient's incapacity was the patient's unwillingness to acknowledge 
his mental disorder. Without this acknowledgement, the psychiatrist 
believed that the patient could not appreciate the benefits of the proposed 
medication. On cross-examination, the psychiatrist admitted that the 
patient had suffered adverse effects from a previous administration of the 
same medication and that the patient's reason for refusing this medica-
tion was rational. I found this patient competent. 
Second, in my opinion, the Group B patients were more seriously 
mentally disordered than were the Group A patients. As the recession 
struck California in 1992 and 1993, severe budgetary constraints were 
placed on public mental health programs. In the San Diego County 
Psychiatric Hospital, three of the four inpatient units were closed. Only 
the most seriously ill patients were accepted; patients who refused 
treatment were often released. Additionally, as doctors became more 
familiar with capacity hearings issues, I believe they became more 
selective in the cases for which they would seek a finding of incapacity. 
Over time, doctors developed alternative strategies to avoid capacity 
hearings. These strategies range from negotiating acceptable medication 
options with the patient to coercing treatment without informing the 
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patient of medication risks and without petitioning for a capacity 
hearing. 
Third, in Group A, ten of the calendared hearings were not heard. Of 
this number, five involved patients who either refused to stipulate to my 
designation as temporary judge or who refused to be represented by the 
public defender.225 Although I did not conduct evidentiary hearings 
in these cases,226 I believe that most of these patients would have been 
found incompetent. For example, one patient who refused to stipulate 
to my designation as temporary judge expressed the belief that no one 
should be able to judge his competence. Despite repeated attempts to 
explain that if I did not hear the matter it would be calendared for a 
hearing by a superior court judge, the patient remained adamant in his 
refusal. People who are unduly suspicious of their appointed attorney 
or the court commissioner are often equally suspicious of the psychiatrist 
assigned by the hospital as their doctor. They are unlikely to weigh 
rationally the doctor's explanation of the medicine's benefits. In 
contrast, because hearing officers do not serve as temporary judges, no 
request for stipulation was made in Group B hearings. In Group B, only 
one calendared hearing was not conducted. In that case, the doctor 
withdrew the petition because the patient began taking medication 
voluntarily before the hearing could be conducted. 
Fourth, two patients in Group A and ten patients in Group B refused 
to attend the capacity hearing. Additionally, two Group B patients 
continually interrupted the facility representative's testimony, and the 
hearings had to be completed outside of their presence. In one Group 
B hearing, the patient attended but remained mute throughout. When 
patients choose not to participate in hearings, they forfeit the opportunity 
to present direct evidence to support a finding of competence. Often 
these same patients are unwilling to cooperate with their counsel. 
Without such cooperation, the facility representative's testimony is rarely 
refuted by effective cross-examination. 
225. In five other Group A cases that were calendared, evidentiary hearings were 
not conducted for the following reasons: (l) the petition was withdrawn because the 
patient was taking medication voluntarily; (2) the patient was a voluntary patient and 
could not be treated involuntarily; (3) the doctor had not completed the declaration of 
the treating physician giving the patient notice of the facts upon which he concluded that 
the patient was not competent to make treatment decisions, and the doctor did not attend 
the hearing; (4) no facility representative was present at the hearing; and (5) neither the 
patient nor his attorney was present at the hearing. 
226. Patients who refused the services of the public defender usually demanded to 
be represented by private counsel. These patients, however, had not engaged private 
counsel to represent them. Because capacity hearings are conducted so quickly after the 
petition is filed, I granted the patients a delay to enable them to contact private attorneys. 
I did not inquire into the patients' financial ability to pay for these services. 
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In only one case did I find a nonattending patient competent, and that 
case occurred in Group A. The psychiatrist testified that the patient was 
mentally ill and delusional. The psychiatrist admitted, however, that he 
had no specific evidence on whether the patient refused medication for 
an irrational reason. The psychiatrist admitted: "We can't assess his 
mind. We can't get him to discuss his reasons for refusing medica-
tions." When the psychiatrist attempted to encourage the patient to 
accept medication by informing him that the medication would enable 
the patient to obtain release faster, the patient responded by stating that 
he would wait out the detention period. I found that the facility had not 
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the patient's medication 
refusal was the result of an irrational reasoning process. In the thirteen 
Group B cases involving patients who either did not attend their 
hearings, were disruptive, or remained mute, the facility representatives 
presented sufficient evidence of the patients' judgmental incapacity to 
satisfy the burden of proof. 
Although I believe that the above-stated reasons, whether individually 
or in combination, account for the disparity in Group A and Group B 
decisions, other factors are worth considering.227 Perhaps I was simply 
inconsistent in my decisionmaking. Despite my familiarity with mental 
health law issues and despite my ten-years' experience as a certification 
227. At the time Group A hearings were conducted, a party who was dissatisfied 
with a hearing result could obtain a rehearing before the same court commissioner who 
made the original decision. Policy adopted by the Honorable Michael D. Wellington, 
San Diego County Superior Court, 1991. Under the legislation governing Group B 
hearings, a dissatisfied party could appeal the hearing officer's decision and receive a 
hearing de novo before a superior court judge. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 5334(e)-(t) 
(West Supp. 1995). I considered whether the difference in this procedure may have been 
a significant factor accounting for the decisionmaking disparity and concluded that it was 
not. I am aware of no Group A or Group B hearing in which a patient found 
incompetent sought either a rehearing or a hearing de novo. However, in three Group 
A hearings in which I found a patient competent, the facility requested a rehearing. In 
the tables, each rehearing is counted as a separate hearing. In a rehearing, the 
decisionmaker considers whether a change in the patient's mental condition since the last 
hearing warrants a different result. The decisionmaker does not consider either 
previously introduced evidence or new evidence of the patient's condition at the time of 
the original hearing. Despite the limited nature of the inquiry, in two of the three 
rehearings, the facility was able to convince me that the patient's mental condition had 
deteriorated since the last hearing and that the patient was no longer competent. In only 
one rehearing did I continue to find the patient competent. Thus, the requirement for 
Group A hearings that rehearings be conducted before the same commissioner who found 
the patient competent originally was not a factor increasing significantly the number of 
decisions in which a patient was found competent. 
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review hearing officer,228 I found decisionmaking in many capacity 
hearings to be extremely difficult. Testimony was not merely conflict-
ing; it was dissatisfying. Psychiatrists often assumed that patients' 
unwillingness to acknowledge their mental disorder was all that was 
needed to establish their incompetence. Many psychiatrists did not 
provide patients with needed information on medication side effects229 
or respect patients' expressed concerns about side effects.230 To these 
psychiatrists, side effects were merely an annoyance but not a legitimate 
reason for rejecting the anticipated benefits of the proposed therapy. 
Patients often assumed that refusal of medication because of a previous 
experience with medication side effects was all that was needed to 
establish their competence. Many refusing patients did not consider their 
doctors' explanations of the benefits anticipated from the proposed 
medication. To these patients, any improvement in mental condition 
could not possibly outweigh the discomfort of medication side effects. 
These cases were not neat little packages for decisionmakers to unwrap 
at their leisure. Nevertheless, I attempted in good faith to decide the 
cases fairly and consistently. Perhaps this report will provide some 
insight as to my success or failure in doing so. 
In evaluating my performance as a decisionmaker, one may wish to 
compare my hearing results with those of other decisionmakers. 
Surprisingly, statewide data on capacity hearings have not been gathered 
or analyzed by the California Department of Mental Health or anyone 
else.231 Some data, however, are available on the San Diego County 
experience. At infrequent meetings of court commissioners and hearing 
officers with the superior court mental health judge, statistics on capacity 
hearing results were occasionally provided by the Office of Counselor 
in Mental Health.232 Although no comprehensive statistics are avail-
228. See Morris, supra note 110. 
229. See infra text accompanying TABLE 8. 
230. See infra text accompanying TABLE 7. 
231. In fact, in response to my inquiry, Lori Chin, a Research Analyst in the 
Performance Outcome Reporting Section of the California Department of Mental Health, 
informed me on August 8, 1994, that she had never heard of the Riese case or legislation 
requiring capacity hearings. Ironically, the legislation imposes a duty on the California 
Department of Mental Health to prepare a report to the legislature before January 1, 
1994, summarizing information on the role of patients' rights advocates and the number 
of advocates needed for adequate representation of patients in capacity hearings. Act of 
Oct. 7, 1991, ch. 181, § 8, 1991 Cal. Stat. The report has not yet been prepared. 
232. Copies of all San Diego County capacity hearings results are on file with the 
author. Upon reviewing my case summaries, I discovered that some ofmy hearings had 
been reported erroneously in the statistical reports provided by the San Diego Superior 
Court's Office of Counselor in Mental Health. For example, some cases that I did not 
decide on the merits were reported as decisions of incompetence. I do not know whether 
data from other court commissioners or hearing officers contain similar mistakes. 
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able for the twenty-month period during which I gathered data on my 
Group A patients, the available statistics suggest that San Diego County 
court commissioners were finding patients competent in approximately 
one of five cases at a time that I was finding patients competent in 
approximately one of two cases.233 Although I have no complete 
explanation for this disparity, I can identify one contributing factor. 
Although Riese hearings were assigned to court commissioners on a 
rotating basis, one court commissioner agreed to serve whenever other 
court commissioners were not available. He heard a disproportionately 
large number of cases. For example, between April and November 
1990, this individual heard forty-five cases while all other court 
commissioners combined heard fifty-seven cases.234 In the forty-five 
hearings, the individual found only one patient (2.2%) competent. The 
remaining court commissioners found nineteen patients (33.3%) 
Because the errors on my cases were relatively few in number, and because I know of 
no other available information on capacity hearings results, I have included the data 
despite these deficiencies. 
233. Court commissioners serving as temporary judges conducted 53 hearings on 
the merits during the three-month period of May through July 1990. Thirteen patients 
(24.5%) were. found competent. OFFICE OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN 
DIEGO SUPER. CT., RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT (undated) (on file with author 
as report #1). During this period, I conducted five hearings on the merits and found 
three patients (60.0%) competent. One of the three findings of competence occurred in 
a rehearing of a previous decision. 
During the eight-month period of April through November 1990, court commissioners 
conducted 102 hearings on the merits and found 20 patients (19.6%) competent. OFFICE 
OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT., RIESE HEARINGS 
STATISTICAL REPORT (undated) (on file with author as report #2). During this period, 
I conducted eight hearings on the merits and found five patients (62.5%) competent. 
During the 12-month period of April 1990 through March 1991, court commissioners 
conducted 155 hearings on the merits and found 30 patients (19.4%) competent. 
PATIENT ADVOCACY PROGRAM, SAN DIEGO COUNTY, SPECIAL REPORT: THE STATUS 
OF RIESE IMPLEMENTATION IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY [hereinafter PATIENT ADVOCACY 
PROGRAM, RIESE REPORT] (undated) (on file with author). During this period, I 
conducted 16 hearings on the merits and found 10 patients (62.5%) competent. 
During the 12-month period of July 1990 through June 1991, court commissioners 
conducted 146 hearings on the merits and found 28 patients (19.2%) competent. OFFICE 
OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT. RIESE HEARINGS 
STATISTICAL REPORT [hereinafter RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #3] (undated) 
( on file with author as report #3). During this period, I conducted 17 hearings on the 
merits and found eight patients ( 4 7.1 % ) competent. 
234. During this time period, these six court commissioners averaged 10.5 hearings 
(57+6). 
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competent. The individual was not appointed as a hearing officer when 
the capacity hearing legislation was implemented in January 1992. 
Although no comprehensive statistics are available for the eighteen-
month period during which I gathered data on my Group B patients, the 
available statistics suggest that San Diego County hearing officers were 
finding patients competent in just under one of four cases at a time that 
I was finding patients competent in just over one of four cases.235 
Although I did not consciously revise my decisionmaking principles, my 
Group B :findings are far more consistent with the findings of other 
decisionmakers than were my Group A :findings. 
The decisions of other hearing officers were influenced by the factors 
identified above that influenced my decisions. However, although these 
factors reduced significantly the percent of patients I found competent, 
the percent increased slightly for other hearing officers. This anomaly 
may be explainable by the absence of one conservative decisionmaker 
who heard numerous cases as a court commissioner at the time my 
Group A cases were decided, but who did not serve as a hearing officer 
at the time my Group B cases were decided. If his decisions were 
excluded, the :findings of competence for other decisionmakers would 
have diminished from one of three (in the Group A time frame) to one 
of four (in the Group B time frame). 
San Diego County court commissioners and hearing officers have 
consistently found patients competent at rates that are higher than 
reported in empirical studies of law-trained decisionmaker models 
utilized in other states.236 When physician findings of patient incom-
petence are not upheld in 20 to 25% of the hearings, one can assert that 
a law-trained decisionmaker model is needed to assure that treatment 
refusal decisions of competent patients are acknowledged.237 
235. Hearing officers conducted 146 hearings on the merits during the IO-month 
period of January through October 1992 and found 28 patients (21.2%) competent. 
OFFICE OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT., RIESE HEARINGS 
STATISTICAL REPORT [hereinafter RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #4] (undated) 
(on file with author as report #4). During this period, I conducted 12 hearings on the 
merits and found three patients (25.0%) competent. 
During the eight-month period of January through August 1993, hearing officers 
conducted 159 hearings on the merits and found 37 patients (23.3%) competent. OFFICE 
OF COUNSELOR IN MENTAL HEALTH, SAN DIEGO SUPER. CT., RIESE HEARINGS 
STATISTICAL REPORT [hereinafter RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #5] (undated) 
( on file with author as report #5). During this period, I conducted 17 hearings on the 
merits and found four patients (23.5%) competent. Two of the 17 were conducted after 
the Group B patient class had been completed. Both of those patients were found 
incompetent. 
236. See supra note 79. 
237. But cf Appelbaum & Schwartz, supra note 10, at 465 (asserting that the. 
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AVERAGE AGE OF PATIENTS (IN YEARS) 
Group A Group B A&B 
(N=31) (N=25) Comb'd 
(N=56) 
44.5 42.6 43.7 
41.3 48 43 
TABLE 2B 
AGE OF PATIENTS IN HEARINGS ON MERITS 
Age
Range Group A Percent Group B Percent A&B Percent 
(N=33) (N=33) Comb'd 
(N=66) 
21-30 9 27.3 8 24.2 17 25.8 
31-40 5 15.2 4 12.1 9 13.6 
41-50 4 12.1 4 12.1 8 12.1 
51-60 5 15.2 4 12.1 9 13.6
61-70 5 15.2 3 9.1 8 . 12.1 
71-80 3 9.1 2 6.1 5 7.6 
Unknown 2 6.1 8 24.2 10 15.2 
AGE OF PATIENTS FOUND COMPETENT 
Age Group A Percent GroupB PercentA&B Percent 
Range Comb'd 
21-30 5 (N=9} 55.6 1 (N=8) 12.5 6 (N=l7} 35.3 
31-40 3 (N=5) 60.0 1 (N=4) 25.0 4 (N=9) 44.4 
41-50 4 (N=4) 100.0 2 (N=4) 50.0 6 (N=8) 75.0 
51-60 2 (N=5) 40.0 1 (N=4) 25.0 3 (N=9) 33.3 
61-70 2 (N=5) 40.0 0 (N=3) 0.0 2 (N=8) 25.0 
71-80 1 (N=3) 33.3 1 (N=2) 50.0 2 (N=5) 40.0 
Unknown 1 (N=2) 50.0 3 (N=8) 37.5 4 (N=lO} 40.0 
assessments of patients' competence by adverse judgments that continue to be large in 
number). 
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Data on patient ages are reported in TABLES 2A and 2B. The average 
age of all patients on whom. information was obtained did not differ 
significantly between Group A and Group B patients. Group B patients 
found competent were only slightly older than Group A patients. TABLE 
2B identifies patient ages in ten-year increments. In both Group A and 
Group B, approximately twice as m.any patients were in the twenty-one 
through thirty age group than any other age group, and I heard similar 
numbers of Group A and Group B cases for patients in higher age 
groups. Although the numbers of patients found competent in each age 
group is too small to perm.it a statistically significant comparison, age 
did not appear to be a contributing factor in m.y Group A or Group B 
decisionm.aking. Even elderly patients in the seventy-one through eighty 
age group were found competent at a rate com.parable to patients in other 
age groups. 
TABLE 3 
TYPE OF FACILITY 
IN HEARINGS ON THE MERITS 
Group A Percent Group B PercentA&B Percent 
Comb'd 
Public 
facilities 20 60.6 17 51.5 37 56.1 
Private 
facilities 13 39.4 16 48.5 29 43.9 
IN HEARINGS WHEN PATIENTS FOUND COMPETENT 
Group A Percent Group B Percent A&B Percent
Comb'd 
Public 
facilities 12 (N=20) 60.0 3 (N=17) 17.6 15 (N=37) 40.5 
Private 
facilities 6 (N=13) 46.2 6 (N=16) 37.5 12 (N=29) 41.4 
Data on the type of facility in which I conducted hearings are 
presented in TABLE 3. I conducted somewhat m.ore hearings in public 
facilities than in private facilities. I was interested in determining 
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whether the type of facility affected my decisionmaking. In Group A 
and Group B hearings combined, I found patients competent at almost 
an identical rate regardless of facility type. The percentage of all 
patients found competent declined from Group A to Group B. The 
decline, however, was far more severe for hearings conducted at public 
facilities (from 60.0% to 17.6%) than private facilities (from 46.2% to 
37.5%). I do not believe the disparity is a result of any bias on my part 
against patients in public facilities. Rather, as explained above, Group 
B patients in public mental health facilities were more seriously ill than 
either Group B patients in private facilities or Group A patients in either 
type of facility. 
TABLE 4 
PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF 
FACILITY REPRESENTATIVES 
IN HEARINGS ON MERITS 
Group A Percent Group B Percent A&B Percent 
Comb'd 
Psychiatrists 22 66.7 18 54.5 40 60.6 
All Others 11 33.3 15 45.5 26 39.4 
IN HEARINGS WHEN PATIENTS FOUND COMPETENT 
Psychiatrists 12 (N=22) 54.5 
All Others 6 (N=ll) 54.5 
5 (N=l8) 27.8 
4 (N=l5) 26.7 
A & B Percent 
Comb'd 
17 (N=40) 42.5 
10 (N=26) 38.5 
Treating psychiatrists diagnose patients; prescribe medication; inform 
patients of medication benefits, risks, and alternatives; assess patients' 
competence; and petition for a hearing. They are the best source of 
evidence to support findings of incompetence. As mentioned above, the 
San Diego County Superior Court rules warn facilities that the failure of 
the psychiatrist to testify may result in insufficient evidence to support 
a finding of the patient's mental incapacity.238 
238. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
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As reported in TABLE 4, the patient's treating psychiatrist served as 
the facility representative in over half the Group A and Group B 
hearings. I was interested in determining whether, in the hearings I 
conducted, the failure of the treating psychiatrist to testify affected the 
hearing's result. The data reveal that psychiatrists and nonpsychiatrists 
were equally adept at proving the patient's incompetence. When the 
treating psychiatrist does not testify, the court requires the psychiatrist 
to submit a written declaration summarizing his or her assessment of the 
patient's competence. The declaration is admitted into evidence and the 
nonpsychiatrist facility representative merely offers additional testimony 
to support the psychiatrist's declaration. Apparently, this procedure is 
working satisfactorily to assure that the facility's case is adequately 
presented. 
TABLE 5A lists the psychiatric diagnoses for Group A and Group B 
patients.239 Although most patients were diagnosed with one mental 
disorder, two Group A and three Group B patients received dual 
diagnoses.240 In my sample population, I heard 29 cases ( 43.9%) 
involving patients diagnosed with mood disorders (bipolar disorder and 
depressive disorder) and 27 cases (40.9%) diagnosed with thought 
disorders (schizophrenia and other psychotic disorder). The most 
common mental disorder was bipolar disorder, diagnosed in nineteen of 
the sixty-six patients (28.8%). Bipolar disorder is a mood disorder 
characterized by the occurrence of one or more manic episodes or both 
manic and depressive episodes.241 The second most common mental 
disorder was schizophrenia, diagnosed in fifteen of the sixty-six patients 
(22.7%). Schizophrenia is a psychotic disorder. Additionally, twelve 
patients (18.2%) were diagnosed with psychotic disorders other than 
schizophrenia. Psychotic disorders are thought disorders characterized 
239. Mental disorders are described in a book published by the American 
Psychiatric Association. The most recent edition of that book was published in 1994. 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (DSM-IV) (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Although psychiatrists 
diagnosing Group A and Group B patients used an earlier edition of that book, i.e., 
DSM-III-R, published in 1987, discussion of diagnoses in this article will be referenced 
to DSM-IV. 
240. In Group A, one patient was diagnosed with psychotic disorder-NOS (i.e., not 
otherwise specified) and mental retardation; another patient was diagnosed with 
schizoaffective disorder and mixed substance abuse. In Group B, one patient was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and Alzheimer's dementia; a second patient was diagnosed 
with schizophrenia, paranoid type, and polydrug abuse; a third patient was diagnosed 
with depression and dementia. 
241. DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 350. 
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DIAGNOSIS OF PATIENTS IN HEARINGS ON THE MERITS 
Diagnosis Group A Percent GroupB Percent A & B Percent 
(N=33) (N=33) Comb'd 
(N=66) 
Bipolar disorder (including 
diagnosis of bipolar affective 
disorder-manic) 13 39.4 6 18.2 19 28.8 
Schizophrenia (including 
diagnosis of schizophrenia-
· paranoid) 4 12.1 11 33.3 15 22.7 
Psychotic Disorder (including 
diagnoses of psychotic disor-
der not otherwise specified 
and atypical psychosis) 3 9.1 9 27.3 12 18.2 
Depressive disorder (including 
diagnosis of major de-
pression) 5 15.2 5 15.2 10 15.2 
Schizoaffective disorder 7 21.2 0 0.0 7 10.6 
Organic disorder (including 
diagnoses of organic brain 
syndrome, organic delusional 
disorder, organic mood 
disorder) 3.0 2 6.1 3 4.5 
Dementia (including diagnosis 
of Alzheimer's dementia) 0 0.0 2 6.1 2 3.0 
Psychoactive Substance Use 
Disorder (including di-
agnoses of mixed substance 
abuse and polydrug abuse) 3.0 1 3.0 2 3.0 
Mental Retardation 3.0 0 0.0 1 1.5 
TOTAL 35 106.1 36 109.1 71 107.4 
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by the presence of psychotic symptoms242 such as delusions,243 hallu-
cinations,244 or disorganized speech.245 
I was interested in discovering whether the most frequently diagnosed 
disorders were similar for each Group, and if not, whether the differenc-
es might have contributed to the disparity in hearing results. The data 
reveal a sharp contrast. Mood disorders. were far more prevalent in 
Group A, accounting for eighteen of the thirty-three cases (54.5%) as 
compared with only eleven Group B cases (33.3%). Thought disorders 
were far more prevalent in Group B, accounting for twenty cases 
(60.6%) as compared with only seven Group A cases (21.2%). 
Psychiatrists have noted that law-trained decisionmakers generally 
conceptualize competence as a cognitive capacity.246 Therefore, 
patients with thought disorders who are suffering from delusions, 
hallucinations, and disorganized speech, are more likely to be found 
incompetent than patients with mood disorders. Patients with mood 
disorders may be found competent if they are capable of coherent speech 
and able to articulate rational objections to medication. Psychiatrists, 
however, have asserted that patients who have an intellectual understand-
ing of a medication's risks and benefits may, nevertheless, be incompe-
tent if their mood disorder causes them to become unduly concerned 
about risks or unable to appreciate the bene:fits.247 For example, 
people with bipolar disorder who are experiencing a manic episode may 
feel an inflated sense of self esteem or grandiosity. They may engage 
excessively iri pleasurable activities despite the high potential for painful 
consequences.248 In their euphoric state, they may deny the existence 
242. Id. at 273. 
243. "Delusions ... are erroneous beliefs that usually involve a misinterpretation 
of perceptions or experiences." Id. at 275. 
244. "Hallucinations ... may occur in any sensory modality . . . but auditory 
hallucinations are by far the most common and characteristic of schizophrenia. Auditory 
hallucinations are usually experienced as voices, whether familiar or unfamiliar, that are 
perceived as distinct from the person's own thoughts." Id. at 275. 
245. Disorganized thinking may be the single most important feature of schizophre-
nia. Because inferences about thought are based primarily on an individual's speech, 
disorganized speech was emphasized in the definition of schizophrenia. Id. at 276. 
Other criteria for schizophrenia include grossly disordered behavior and negative 
symptoms, such as affective flattening, alogia, and avolition. Id. 
246. Thomas G. Gutheil & Harold Bursztajn, Clinicians' Guidelines for Assessing 
and Presenting Subtle Forms of Patient Incompetence in Legal Settings, 143 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1020, 1020 (1986) 
247. Harold J. Bursztajn, Beyond Cognition: The Role of Disordered Affective 
States in Impairing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 383, 384 (1991). 
248. DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 332. 
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of a mental disorder or the potential benefit from treatment. 249 A 
study comparing thirty treatment-refusing patients with thirty treatment-
consenting patients revealed a significant diagnostic difference between 
the two groups: nine of the twelve diagnosed with bipolar disorder 
(75%) refused medication; twenty-two of the thirty-two diagnosed with 
schizophrenia ( 68.8%) consented.250 
Because a person's mood may influence the weighing of risks and 
benefits, mood disturbances are an appropriate component of a compe-
tence assessment. However, in considering a patient's mood, 
decisionmakers should not equate a diagnosis of bipolar disorder or other 
mood disorder with incompetence, just as they should not equate a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia or any other disorder with incompetence. 
Proof of mental disorder, whether acknowledged by the patient or not, 
is only one factor in establishing a patient's incompetence. The question 
to be determined is whether the patient is competent to refuse medication 
despite his or her mental disorder.251 Thus, as reported in TABLE 5B, 
of the twenty-nine cases I heard involving patients diagnosed with mood 
disorders, twelve were found competent (41.4%). Of the twenty-seven 
cases I heard involving patients diagnosed with thought disorders, nine 
were found competent (33.3%). Although thought disordered patients 
were found incompetent at a higher rate than were mood disordered 
patients, diagnosis alone was not determinative. Some thought 
disordered patients were found competent, some were not. Some mood 
disordered patients were found competent, some were not. 
249. Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 79, at 283 (Studies have suggested that 
patients experiencing the pleasurable state of grandiosity may reject medication because 
they are reluctant to part with feelings of superiority.); Gutheil & Bursztajn, supra note 
246, at 1021 (Patients in a manic state may deny the possibility that treatment may 
benefit them.); Paul Rodenhauser, Treatment Refusal in a Forensic Hospital: Ill-Use of 
the Lasting Light, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 59, 61 (1984) (Among 
forensic patients studied, the leading causes of medication refusal were grandiosity and 
denial of mental disorder.). 
250. Julie M. Zito et al., Clinical Characteristics of Hospitalized Psychotic Patients 
Who Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Therapy, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 822, 824 (1985). 
251. The Riese court cited approvingly a federal district judge's estimate that 85% 
of involuntarily committed mental patients are competent to make medication decisions. 
Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1321, 271 Cal. Rptr. 
199, 210 (1987) (citing with approval Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 927 (N.D. 
Ohio 1980)) (republished opinion). 
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TABLE 5B
DIAGNOSES OF PATIENTS FOUND COMPETENT 
Diagnosis Group A Percent GroupGroup B Percent A & B Percent 
Comb'd 
Bipolar disorder (including 
diagnosis of bipolar 
affective disorder-manic) 7 (N=13) 53.8 2 (N=6) 33.3 9 (N=!9) 47.4 
Schizophrenia (including 
diagnosis of schizophrenia-
paranoid) 2 (N=4) 50.0 2 (N=ll) 18.2 4 (N=l5) 26.7 
Psychotic disorder (including 
diagnoses of psychotic 
disorder not otherwise 
specified and atypical 
psychosis) 1 (N=3) 33.3 4 (N=9) 44.4 5 (N=l2) 41.7 
Depressive disorder (including 
diagnosis of major 
depression) 3 (N=5) 60.0 0 (N=5) 0.0 3 (N=l0) 30.0 
Schizoaffective disorder 4 (N=7) 57.1 0 (N=0) 0.0 4 (N=7) 57.1 
Organic disorder (including 
diagnoses of organic brain 
syndrome, organic 
delusional disorder, and 
organic mood disorder) 1 (N=l) 100.0 1 (N=2) 50.0 2 (N=3) 66.7 
Dementia (including diagnosis 
of Alzheimer's dementia) 0 (N=0) 0.0 2 (N=2) 100.0 2 (N=2) 100.0 
Psychoactive Substance 
Use Disorder (including 
diagnoses of mixed 
substance abuse 
and polydrug abuse) 1 (N=l) 100.0 1 (N=l) 100.0 2 (N=2) 100.0 
Mental retardation 0 (N=l) 0.0 0 (N=0) 0.0 0 (N=l) 0.0. 
TOTAL 19 (N=35) 54.3 12 (N=36) 33.3 31 (N=71) 43.7 
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TABLE 5B supports my assertion that Group B patients were more 
seriously disordered than were Group A patients. In virtually every 
diagnostic category, the percent of patients found competent declined 
from Group A to Group B. The percent of patients found competent 
when diagnosed with schizophrenia or other psychotic disorder declined 
from 42.8% in Group A to 30.0% in Group B. The percent of patients 
found competent when diagnosed with bipolar disorder or depressive 
disorder declined from 55.6% in Group A to 18.2% in Group B. 
Although mood disorder diagnoses predominated in Group A patients 
and thought disorder diagnoses predominated in Group B patients, my 
assertion that Group B patients were more seriously disordered is not 
based on a belief that thought disorders are more serious disorders than 
mood disorders. I note, for example, that a person suffering from major 
depressive disorder-a common mood disorder-may lose interest in 
nearly all activity, feel worthless, and have recurrent thoughts of 
death.252 Approximately 15% of people with severe cases of major 
depressive disorder commit suicide.253 
TABLE 6 summarizes the evidence introduced by facility representa-
tives to support their assertions that patients were incompetent to make 
medication decisions. The most frequently cited reason, mentioned in 
over 90% of Group A and Group B cases, was the patient's refusal to 
acknowledge his or her mental disorder. The almost universal reliance 
on this reason is not surprising. To assist in the implementation of 
capacity hearings, the San Diego County Superior Court approved a 
"script" that was used by court commissioners who acted as temporary 
judges and is currently used by mental health hearing officers. The 
script contains a series of questions designed to elicit relevant testimony 
from facility representatives. Because the Riese case identifies the 
patient's willingness to acknowledge mental disorder as a competence 
assessment factor,254 the treating psychiatrist is asked: "Does the 
patient believe that he or she suffers from a mental disorder?" When the 
treating psychiatrist does not serve as the facility representative, the 
physician's declaration containing a written response to the same 
question is introduced into evidence. 
252. DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 327, 339. 
253. Id. at 340. 
254. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 211; see supra text 
accompanying notes 129-31. 
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TABLE 6 
FACILITY REPRESENTATIVES' EVIDENCE 
Reasons Given to Support Group A Percent Group B Percent A & B Percent 
Determination of Incapacity (N=33) (N=33) Comb'd 
(N=66) 
A Patient does not acknowl-
edge his or her mental 
disorder. 32 97.0 30 90.9 62 93.9 
B Patient is psychotic, 
delusional etc. 20 60.6 22 66.7 42 63.6 
C Patient will not listen to 
explanation of risks and 
benefits. 8 24.2 13 39.4 21 31.8 
D Patient is dangerous to self 
or others. 12 36.4 7 21.2 19 28.8 
E Patient is paranoid or 
suffers from paronoia. 7 21.2 12 36.4 19 28.8 
F Patient is mute or unre-
sponsive. 7 21.2, 9 27.3 16 24.2 
G Patient's condition has not 
improved or will not im-
prove without medica-
tion. 2 6.1 8 24.2 10 15.2 
H Patient refuses food. 3 9.1 3 9.1 6 9.1 
I Patient's claim of allergic 
reaction or side effects 
to medication is not sub-
stantiated. 3 9.1 2 6.1 5 7.6 
J Patient's intellectual func-
tion is impaired. 2 6.1 3.0 3 4.5 
TOTAL 96 107 203 
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Even if psychiatrists were not specifically questioned about the issue, 
a patient's refusal to acknowledge mental disorder would remain a 
popular reason to support a determination of incompetence. A compe-
tent decision on whether to accept or reject treatment requires a 
weighing of the anticipated benefits as well as the possible risks and 
alternatives of that treatment. Patients who believe that they have no 
mental disorder are unlikely to value the therapeutic effects of a 
medication to treat a mental disorder. 
In over 60% of Group A and Group B cases, the psychiatrist testified 
( either in person or by written declaration) that the patient was psychotic 
or delusional. Because psychotic individuals are, by definition, grossly 
impaired in reality testing,255 their ability to assess rationally the risks 
and benefits of proposed medication is questionable. Psychotic 
symptoms include delusions and hallucinations.256 Thus, for example, 
a patient with a delusional belief that the doctor wishes to harm him or 
her may believe that the proposed medication is poison. A medication 
refusal for this reason would be irrational. 
In TABLE 6, evidence that the patient is paranoid or suffers from 
paranoia is categorized as a separate reason. Although, properly used, 
the words· "paranoid" or "paranoia" imply the presence of delusions or 
hallucinations,257 sometimes these words are used inappropriately to 
suggest suspiciousness. Because suspiciousness may be rationally based, 
it is not an appropriate symptom of psychosis. In fourteen of the 
nineteen cases in which the psychiatrist testified that the patient was 
paranoid or suffers from paranoia, the psychiatrist also testified that the 
patient was psychotic or delusional. When the two reasons are 
combined, but not double-counted, the data reveal that in twenty-two 
Group A cases (66.7%) and twenty-five Group B cases (75.8%), 
255. DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 273. 
256. Id.; see supra notes 243-44. 
257. The essential feature of schizophrenia, paranoid type, "is the presence of 
prominent delusions or auditory hallucinations in the context of a relative preservation 
of cognitive functioning and affect." DSM-IV, supra note 239, at 287. The essential 
feature of delusional disorder "is the presence of one or more nonbizarre delusions that 
persist for at least 1 month .... " Id. at 296. In the previous edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual, delusional disorder was named delusional (paranoid) disorder. 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (DSM-III-R) 199-203 (3d ed. rev. 1987). 
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evidence was introduced that the patient was either experiencing 
psychotic symptoms or paranoia.258 
Facility representatives offered an average of three reasons to support 
a determination of incapacity. The two most frequently cited reasons 
were the patient's refusal to acknowledge mental disorder and the 
patient's psychosis or delusions.259 No other single reason was offered 
in more than one-third of the combined Group A and Group B cases. 
Nevertheless, there were some differences between the two groups in the 
use of various reasons. For example, evidence that the patient was 
dangerous was introduced more frequently in Group A hearings than in 
Group B hearings. Perhaps as psychiatrists became more familiar with 
the criteria used to determine competence, they realized that evidence of 
the patient's dangerousness is irrelevant to the assessment of compe-
tence. 
Evidence that the patient was paranoid and evidence that the patient 
would not listen to an explanation of risks and benefits was introduced 
more frequently in Group B hearings than in Group A hearings. The 
two reasons compliment each other. A person who is preoccupied by 
paranoid delusions may not be willing to listen to the doctor's explana-
tion of medication risks and benefits. The more frequent use of these 
reasons in Group B hearings may indicate that the Group B patients 
were more seriously mentally disordered than the Group A patients. 
Evidence that the patient's condition had not improved without 
medication or that it would not improve without medication was also 
introduced more frequently in Group B hearings than in Group A 
hearings. I can only speculate why this occurred. Perhaps the reason 
was offered to suggest that the patient was seriously mentally disordered 
and that alternatives to the proposed medication did not exist. Perhaps 
the reason was offered to suggest that the psychiatrist was willing to 
accept the patient's medication refusal if improvement in the patient's 
mental condition could occur without medication. If, however, 
psychiatrists were more willing to defer to their patients' treatment 
refusal decisions, the number of hearings should have decreased. It did 
not. The number of San Diego County hearings conducted during the 
Group A time period averaged less than thirteen per month.260 When 
258. Evidence of either psychotic symptoms or paranoia was introduced in 47 Group 
A and Group B cases combined (71.2%). 
259. In four cases, the psychiatrist gave only one reason to support a finding of 
incapacity. Refusal to acknowledge mental disorder was the reason given in three of the 
four cases. 
260. From April 1990 through March 1991, 155 hearings were conducted on the 
merits, an average of 12.9 per month. PATIENT ADVOCACY PROGRAM, RIESE REPORT, 
supra note 233. From July 1990 through June 1991, 146 hearings were conducted on 
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TABLE 7 
PATIENTS' EVIDENCE 
Reasons Given For Group A Percent GroupGroup B Percent A & B Percent
Refusing Medication (N=33) (N=33) Comb'd 
(N=66) 
A 1 Patient experienced side 
effects from previous 
administration of medi-
cation. 23 69.7 17 51.5 40 60.6 
B 1 Patient says he or she 
doesn't need or doesn't 
want the medication. 9 27.3 12 36.4 21 31.8 
C 1Patient does not trust or is 
angry at the psychiatrist. 6 18.2 14 42.4 20 30.3 
D 1 Patient denies having a 
mental disorder. 7 21.2 12 36.4 19 28.8 
E1 Patient claims the medica-
tion has not helped in 
the past or will not 
help now. 6 18.2 8 24.2 14 21.2 
F1 Patient expresses con-
cem about possible side 
effects. 7 21.2 6 18.2 13 19.7 
G1 Patient asserts risks and 
benefits of proposed 
medication have not 
been explained. 5 15.2 5 15.2 10 15.2 
H1 Patient asserts that he 
or she is being detained 
illegally, or that he or 
she has a legal right to 
refuse treatment. 4 12.1 6 18.2 10 15.2 
I 1 Patient's lifestyle or reli-
gious belief is to reject 
all medicines. 6 18.2 2 6.1 g 12.1 
J 1 Patient says he or she 
doesn't care whether he 
or she gets well or not. 3.0 3.0 2 3.0 
TOTAL 74 83 157 
the merits, an average of 12.2 per month. RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #3, 
supra note 233. 
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Group B hearings were conducted, the number of hearings rose to 14.6 
per month from January through October 1992 and to 19.9 per month 
from January through August 1993.261 
TABLE 7 summarizes the evidence introduced by patients to support 
their assertions that their medication refusal decisions were competently 
made. In most cases, the table reflects the testimony of patients in their 
hearings. Although the testifying psychiatrist is asked what information 
was given to the patient on medication risks, benefits, and alternatives 
and what did the patient say or do in response, the best source of 
evidence on reasons for a patient's treatment refusal is the testimony of 
the patient himself or herself. In the two Group A and thirteen Group 
B hearings in which the patient did not participate, the table reflects the 
psychiatrist's answer. 
The most frequently cited reason for medication refusal, mentioned in 
almost 70% of Group A cases and over 50% of Group B cases, was side 
effects experienced from previous administration of medication. Patient 
concern about potential medication side effects was categorized as a 
separate reason. In nine of the thirteen cases in which patients testified 
that they were concerned about potential side effects, they also testified 
that they had previously experienced medication side effects. When the 
two reasons are combined, but not double-counted, the data reveal that 
in twenty-six Group A cases (78.8%) and eighteen Group B cases 
(54.5%), evidence was introduced that the patient either experienced side 
effects previously or was concerned about potential side effects.262 
Psychotropic medications are powerful drugs that may produce tem-
porary and permanent side effects that are discomforting,263 painful,264 
261. From January through October 1992, 146 hearings were conducted on the 
merits, an average of 14.6 per month. RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #4, supra 
note 235. From January through August 1993, 159 hearings were conducted on the 
merits, an average of 19.9 per month. RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #5, supra 
note 235. Some of the increase in the number of hearings is attributable to the 
elimination of the requirement that the patient stipulate to the decisionmaker's 
qualifications. See supra text accompanying notes 225-26. 
262. Evidence of either an experience with medication side effects or concern about 
potential side effects was introduced in 44 Group A and Group B cases combined 
(66.7%). 
263. Sedation is a common non-neurologicalside effect of psychotropic medication. 
Sedated patients experience drowsiness and fatigue. Cichon, supra note 9, at 297. Other 
non-neurological side effects include anticholinergic disturbances such as blurred vision, 
dry mouth, urinary retention, and constipation. Id. at 297-98. 
264. Ak:athisia is an extrapyramidal side effect of psychotropic medication. 
Ak:athisia "is characterized by a painful irritability and a persistent desire to move. 
Symptoms can include a constant tapping of feet, alteration of posture and shifting of 
legs, fidgeting, pacing, and an inability to feel comfortable in any position." Id. at 301. 
Dystonias are another extrapyramidal side effect. "Dystonic reactions often involve 
acute and very painful spasms of muscle groups including those in the neck, face, eyes, 
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disabling,265 and even deadly.266 Although competent decisionmaking 
should also weigh the potential benefits of the proposed medication, a 
patient's concern about side effects, particularly if those side effects have 
been experienced previously, may be a rational basis to support a 
medication refusal. 
In each hearing, the psychiatrist is asked whether the patient objected 
to the use of psychotropic medication because of side effects from prior 
treatment. In many cases, the psychiatrist reported no such patient 
objection. In subsequent testimony, however, the patient often stated 
that he or she refused medication because of previous experiences with 
side effects. The underreporting of pl3:tient concern about side effects is 
not unique to the psychiatrists who testified in the hearings that I 
conducted. In a study of mental patients admitted to four acute inpatient 
units in Massachusetts mental health facilities, the researchers compared 
the reasons given by patients for refusing medication with their doctors' 
perceptions of those reasons.267 The single most frequently cited 
reason for medication refusal was side effects, mentioned by 35% of the 
patients. Physicians, however, identified patient concern about side 
effects in only 7% of the cases.268 
pelvis, trunk, and the extremities." Id. at 303. 
265. Tardive dyskinesia is a side effect of psychotropic medication that is 
characterized by "uncontrollable repetitive movements principally affecting the face, 
tongue, mouth, trunk (including respiratory muscles), upper and lower extremities, neck, 
shoulders, and pelvis. In the more pronounced cases, patients may have difficulty in 
swallowing (resulting in weight loss), talking, and breathing .... " Id. at 304. 
Parkinsonism is an extrapyramidal side effect of psychotropic medication. "Its 
symptoms include a mask-like face, tremors of the limbs, muscle rigidity, spasms, 
drooling, a stooped and shuffling gait, and a general slowing of motor responses." Id. 
at 300. Akinesia is a subcategory of Parkinsonism, "characterized by a decrease in 
spontaneous mobility and speech along with a general feeling of listlessness and apathy." 
Id. at 301. Other disabling side effects include obstructed vision, blindness, and sexual 
dysfunction. Id. at 298, 303. 
266. Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a side effect of psychotropic medication. 
Its symptoms include "hyperthermia (fever), severe skeletal rigidity, elevated blood 
pressure, tachycardia, and alterations in consciousness including delirium, mutism, 
stupor, and coma. . . . This disorder is fatal in twenty to thirty percent of the cases . 
. . . " Id. at 308. Dyscrasias are potentially fatal blood disorders that may occur as 
psychotropic medication side effects. Id. at 298-99. 
267. Hoge et al., supra note 11, at 950-51. 
268. Id. at 954. 
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In the hearings I conducted, there were other obvious inconsistencies 
in the evidence. As one such example, in more than 90% of the cases, 
psychiatrists reported that patients did not acknowledge their mental. 
disorder. However, in fewer than 30% of the cases, patients testified 
that they refused medication because they had no mental disorder. As 
another example, psychiatrists responding to a standard question 
uniformly testified that they informed or attempted to inform the patient 
of the potential risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, the proposed 
medication. Nevertheless, in 15.2% of the cases, patients testified that 
they refused medication because they had not been so informed. Other 
patients testified that they had not been informed but did not base their 
refusal on the lack of information. Often, these patients experienced side 
effects previously and were aware of at least some of the medication 
risks. Although their medication refusal was based on their prior 
experience, they were entitled to the full explanation of medication 
benefits, side effects, ·and alternatives. Granted, in some cases, an 
individual may be too confused to remember that he or she heard a 
psychiatrist's explanation. Nevertheless, the frequent patient complaint 
that no explanation was given is highly disturbing. 
In the Massachusetts study, researchers reported that patients and their 
doctors agreed only 37% of the time on reasons for medication 
refusal.269 The researchers, including Drs. Appelbaum, Gutheil, and 
other noted psychiatrists, concluded: "The frequent failure of psychia-
trists to recognize patients' reasons for refusing suggests a lack of 
communication between them· about the basis for refusal . . . ." 270At 
a minimum, hearing officers should be skeptical of psychiatrists' reports 
of their patients' reasons for refusing medication.271 
Patients offered an average of two reasons to explain why they refused 
medication. However, no single reason other than previous experience 
with medication side effects was offered in more than one-third of the 
combined Group A and Group B cases.272 Nevertheless, there were 
some differences between the two groups in the use of various reasons. 
For example, evidence that the patient rejected medication because of a 
religious belief or a lifestyle choice was introduced more frequently in 
Group A hearings than in Group B hearings. Such evidence may 
269. Id. 
270. Id. 
271. In a related context, Drs. Appelbaum and Hoge noted that when researchers 
offer their own opinions as to why patients refuse medication, the possibility. of 
researcher bias is significant. Appelbaum & Hoge, supra note 79, at 285. 
272. In 13 cases, the patient gave only one reason for refusing medication. Previous 
experience with medication side effects was the reason given in eight of the 13 cases. 
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support a finding of competence. In one of the first appellate cases 
recognizing the right to refuse psychotropic medication, the Second 
Circuit held that a practicing Christian Scientist, whose religious beliefs 
predated any mental disorder and who had not been adjudicated 
incompetent, stated a claim for damages resulting from forced medica-
tion in violation of her constitutional right to religious freedom.273 
Over the years, the right to refuse psychotropic medication has evolved 
to protect the competent decisionmaking of patients who also refuse 
medication for nonreligious reasons, including a lifestyle choice to reject 
any medical treatment. An individual's decision to forego medication 
and to substitute natural treatments - herbs, vitamins, or even fresh 
air-is not a fortiori irrational simply because it deviates from the norm. 
In a free society, an individual's idiosyncratic or eccentric beliefs must 
be respected even if society views them as strange. 
In more Group B than Group A cases, the patient either denied having 
a mental disorder or testified that he or she did not trust or was angry 
at the psychiatrist. On their face, these reasons do not seem to support 
the patient's position. In fact, their more frequent use in Group B 
hearings may suggest that the Group B patients suffered from more 
serious mental disorders than Group A patients. After all, when a 
psychiatrist, whose training and expertise is in diagnosing mental 
disorder, has diagnosed a mental disorder, is the patient's denial worthy 
of consideration? When a psychiatrist, ·whose training and expertise is 
in treating mental disorder, prescribes a psychotropic medication to 
improve the patient's condition, is the patient's hostility toward the 
psychiatrist justifiable? Surprisingly, the answer to both questions may 
be "yes." 
Previously, I suggested that hearing officers should consider whether 
a patient's seemingly rational objections to medication were so 
influenced by a mood disorder that the patient's judgment was irration-
al.274 Similarly, a hearing officer should consider whether a patient's 
seemingly irrational objections to medication were, in fact, rationally 
based. For example, does the patient who appears to deny a mental 
disorder acknowledge a problem in nonmedical terms? Is the patient 
denying mental disorder in order to maintain control over his or her life 
and to avoid being thrust into the dependent role of a mental patient? 
273. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). 
274. See supra text accompanying notes 247-51. 
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Is the denial an attempt to avoid a catch-22 situation, i.e., by admitting 
mental disorder the patient strengthens the psychiatrist's assertion that 
medication is the appropriate remedy? Is the patient's hostility toward 
the psychiatrist a rational reaction either to the patient's involuntary 
detention or to the lack of communication between the psychiatrist and 
the patient? 
Through cross-reference with TABLES 6 and 7, TABLE 8 identifies the 
evidence introduced to support the parties' positions in each hearing. 
Although this evidence was categorized for purposes of tabular 
presentation, the evidence introduced in each case was distinct. 
Although certain types of reasons were more influential than others, I 
did not decide individual cases by focusing on the types of reasons 
presented. Rather, I considered the evidence that was introduced in each 
case, the credibility of witnesses, and the· oral arguments of both sides. 





SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE INTRODUCED, DECISIONS 
MADE, AND RATIONALE FOR EACH DECISION 
Facility's Patient's 
Evidence Evidence Decision and Rationale 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
GROUP A 
#1-43 (Cases that were not decided on the merits have been deleted.) 
1 A,B A1,C1 Competent. Although the patient was 
unwilling to acknowledge that he suf-
fered from a mental illness, the psy-
chiatrist admitted that the patient was 
cognitively able to understand the 
risks and benefits of medication and to 
evaluate them rationally. In his testi-
mony, the patient complained of a 
side effect (sleeplessness) which 
ceased when the medication was dis-
continued. 
2 A, I A1,H1 Competent. Although the patient 
claimed to be someone other than the 
person who was lawfully committed to 
the facility, nevertheless, the patient's 
refusal of medication was based on 
concern about possible side effects 
from the proposed medication. Be-
cause she previously experienced side 
effects, the patient's concern seemed 
rational. 
[VOL. 32: 343, 1995] 
Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
3 A,B B1,C1, 
J1
4 A,G, A1,H1 
I 
5 A,B, A1,D1, 
D E1,H1 
7 A,E, A1 
H 
Judging Judgment 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Decision and Rationale 
Incompetent. The patient stated that the doctors 
were practicing witchcraft and didn't trust any of 
them. The patient also believed the medicine 
was poison. The patient did not indicate that he 
was refusing medication because of concern 
about side effects. (Rehearing of case # 1 ). 
Competent. The patient's condition had not 
deteriorated since the last hearing. She based 
her refusal primarily on side effects that she had 
suffered previously and could suffer if medica-
tion was administered. These side effects have 
been documented. (Rehearing of case #2). 
Incompetent. The patient did not acknowledge 
suffering from a mental disorder, although he 
made statements in the hearing that indicated he 
was psychotic. In explaining why he refused 
medication, the patient simply asserted his right 
to dissent but gave no rational basis for his dis-
sent. He did not express a concern about side 
effects until he was prompted to do so by the 
public defender. 
Incompetent. This profoundly dehydrated and 
malnourished patient could not give a rational 
explanation for why he refused food. Although 
he had experienced side effects from previous 
medications and expressed concern about side 
effects as his reason for refusing medication, I 
concluded that he had not considered rationally 
the anticipated benefits of the medication. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence Decision and Rationale 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
8 B,F, A1,C1 Competent. The patient articulated rational 
H concerns about side effects she had expe-
rienced. She also expressed a willingness 
to continue taking medications if not on an 
empty stomach. Although the psychiatrist 
stated that the patient might not take the 
medication, the question to be decided is 
whether she is competent to make a judg-
ment regarding mediation, not whether her 
judgment is to accept the medication. 
10 A,D A1,B1, Competent. The patient experienced side 
l1 effects previously and thus had a rational 
reason for refusing. Additionally, the pa-
tient expressed a sincere belief in homeopa-
thy and rejects all medicine . 
17 A,B A1,D1 Incompetent. Although the patient's refusal 
was based in part on side effects of previ-
ous administration, patient's irrational con-
cem that others were trying to poison him 
so affected his judgment that he could not 
make a rational decision. 
18 A,D, A1,G1 Competent. The patient rationally refused 
F medication because of side effects he was 
suffering. The patient was willing to con-
sider taking other medication that might not 
have same effect. 
19 A,B A1,F1 Competent. The patient acknowledged his 
mental disorder. The patient expressed a 
willingness to take medications, despite his 
concern about side effects, to avoid being 
placed in restraint and seclusion. This deci-
sion seems rationally based. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
20 A,C, A1,B1, 
D,F D1,F1, 
I1





23 A,B, A1,B1, 
C,D, C1 
E 
24 A,C, A1 
H 
25 A,B A1,D1, 
I1 
Judging Judgment 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Decision and Rationale 
Incompetent. Although the patient expressed 
some concerns about side effects, the primary 
reason she refused was her belief she was not 
mentally ill. Her testimony, however, led me 
to conclude she was mentally ill. 
Competent. The patient was in contact with 
reality and gave a rational reason-experi-
encing side effects--for refusing. He ex-
pressed a willingness to take medications 
· because he realizes he's "a confused human 
being." 
Incompetent. The patient was not able to 
communicate. 
Competent. Two days before the hearing, the 
patient was medicated intramuscularly on an 
emergency basis when he acted violently 
toward a staff member. At the hearing, the 
patient was sedated and in good contact with 
reality. He gave a rational reason for refusing 
medication-various side effects. Neverthe-
less, he expressed a willingness to take lithi-
um, which he previously refused. 
Competent. The patient acknowledged her 
mental disorder. The patient had a rational 
reason-side effects--for refusing. The pa-
tient was willing to take some psychotropic 
medication. 
Incompetent. The patient denied being mental-
ly ill but admitted having "an environmentally 
ill personality." She did not consider the 
potential benefits from medication but refused 
it because it tasted bad and because it might 
affect her unborn fetus. The patient, however, 
was not pregnant. The patient's reasoning 
was not rational. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence Decision and Rationale 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
26 A,B, A1 Incompetent. The patient did not attend the 
C,F hearing. The patient's attorney merely specu-
lated that the patient's refusal was based on 
concern about side effects mentioned in the 
patient's chart. 
27 A,B, A1,E1 Incompetent. The patient was extremely 
C depressed. Although her answers sounded 
rational, she did not appear to be making a 
risk/benefit assessment and was not refusing 
medication due to side effects she had experi-
enced previously. Rather, her feeling of hope-
lessness--i.e., that the medication won't do any 
good-led her to refuse. 
28 A,D A1,B1 Competent. The patient acknowledged having a 
E1 mental disorder, was able to articulate the bene-
fits that the psychiatrist believed would result 
from the medication, and articulated rational 
concerns about side effects he had experienced 
and the lack of positive results from prior ad-
ministration of psychotropic medication. 
29 A,D, C1,D1 Incompetent. Evidence of violent outbursts by 
J the patient indicated his failure to understand 
how the medicine would benefit him by reduc-
ing agitation. The patient appeared confused at 
the hearing. (Rehearing of case #28). 
31 A,B, Incompetent. The patient interrupted the facili-
C ty representative's testimony several times. 
When the patient was called to testify, howev-
er, she became upset and left the hearing. No 
reason was given for refusing medications. 
32 A,D, A1,F1, Competent. The patient expressed rational con-
I G1 cerns about side effects he had suffered and 
side effects he had observed others suffering. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
33 A,B, B1,F1, 
E I1 
34 A,B, A1,G1 
C,D, 
E 
35 A,D A1,G1 
36 A,B, A1 
E,F 
37 A,B, D1,E1, 
C,E F1,H1 
38 A,B B1,C1, 
D1 
Judging Judgment 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Decision and Rationale 
Competent. The patient gave rational reasons 
for refusing medications: concern about how 
the medications would affect a thyroid condi-
tion that the patient had years ago and a life-
style belief against taking any drugs. 
Incompetent. Although the patient expressed a 
rational concern about side effects, he did not 
acknowledge his mental disorder and did not 
understand what the psychiatrists were at-
tempting to accomplish by treating him with 
medication. Although risks and benefits were 
explained to him, he was unwilling to consid-
er the psychiatrist's perspective before making 
a decision. 
Competent. The patient was depressed be-
cause he had tested HIV-positive. Neverthe-
less, his refusal of an antidepressant was ra-
tionally based and the facility representative 
so testified, contradicting the declaration of 
the treating psychiatrist. 
Incompetent. The patient did not testify coher-
ently. Her statements shifted from one topic 
to another with no apparent connection. At 
one point, the patient became agitated at me 
and others for no apparent or expressed rea-
son. 
Competent. The patient had both rational and 
irrational reasons for refusing. In part, he was 
concerned about side effects; in part, he be-
lieved he was not mentally ill. 
Competent. Although the psychiatrist ex-
pressed an opinion that the patient was men-
tally ill and delusional, he offered no evidence 
that the patient's reason for refusing medica-
tion was irrational. The patient did not attend 
the hearing. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence Decision and Rationale 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
40 A,B B1, I1 Incompetent. Throughout the hearing, the pa-
tient was extremely agitated and distraught. 
She continually interrupted the psychiatrist's 
presentation. When given an opportunity to 
speak, she gave no rational reason for refusing 
medication. 
41 A,B A1,E1, Competent. The patient was knowledgeable 
D G1, I1 about, and expressed a sincere belief in, the 
Christian Science religion. Additionally, the 
patient experienced side effects from the medi-
cation previously administered to her. 
42 A,E, Competent. A court interpreter spoke to the 
F patient in her native Philippine dialect---Uocano. 
Her answers were rational and coherent. She 
showed no signs of depression or muteness. 
She expressed a willingness to take psychotrop-
ic medication. 
43 A B1,E1, Incompetent. Although the patient articulated a 
F1 rational concern for refusing medication - her 
daughter experienced side effects from the same 
medication-I did not believe she adequately 
considered its possible benefit. She did not 
believe she was mentally ill and did not under-
stand how the medication would help her condi-
tion. She was unable to focus on a single topic 
for any length of time. 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Decision and Rationale 
#44-77 (Cases that were not decided on the merits have been deleted.) 
44 A,C, B1,C1, Incompetent. The patient did not state a ration-
E E1 al reason for why she refused an injectable or 
liquid form of medication 'but was willing to 
accept medication in pill form. At the hearing, 
she expressed no concern about side effects, 
although in cross-examination of the psychia-
trist, the patient's attorney established that she 
had suffered anticholinergic side effects caused 
by the medication. 
45 A,B, C1,D1, Incompetent. The patient denied being mentally 
C,E F1,H1 ill but gave lengthy, and sometimes incoherent, 
answers to questions. The patient's unwilling-
ness to discuss the psychiatrist's information on 
the effects of medication, or consequences to 
her if she refused to take it, suggested that her 
thought process was irrationaL 
46 A,B, A1,B1, Incompetent. The patient repeatedly interrupted 
C,D C1,D1, the hearing with verbal abuse toward the psy-
E1,G1 chiatrist. Ultimately the hearing was conducted 
outside the patient's presence. The evidence 
established that the patient was incapable of 
listening to information and evaluating it ration-
ally. The patient would not consider the 
medication's benefits. 
47 A A1,B1, Competent. The patient had rational reasons for 
E1 refusing medications. The patient expressed 
concern about side effects she had suffered 
when she took medication voluntarily earlier, 
during this detention. Additionally, she claimed 
medication had not helped her sort out her 
thoughts. The patient was knowledgeable about 
medications and their effects. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence Decision and Rationale 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
48 A A1,E1, Competent. The patient gave rational responses to 
questions. He previously experienced side effects 
of medications and based his refusal on concerns 
about side effects. He was willing to take some 
medications but not the specific psychotropic med-
ications that were being proposed. 
49 A,B, A1,C1, Incompetent. The patient continually interrupted 
C,E, D1,H1 the hearing claiming everyone was violating his 
G rights. The patient did not trust the psychiatrist 
and would not consider potential benefits of the 
medication. Although he expressed a concern 
about side effects, I was not convinced that he was 
refusing medication because of this concern. 
50 A,B, C1,D1, Incompetent. The patient denied any mental illness 
C H1 despite the psychiatrist's evidence to the contrary. 
The patient's conduct at the hearing and testimony 
also confirmed her disordered condition. She also 
asserted that it was unlawful for the psychiatrist to 
treat her. She was unable to evaluate risks and 
benefits rationally. 
51 C,F C1 Incompetent. The patient did not attend the hear-
ing. The evidence established that she refused 
medication but gave no reason for doing so. She 
did not listen to explanations about risks and bene-
fits. She exhibited extreme behavioral disorgani-
zation in the hospital. 
52 A,E, C1,D1, Incompetent. The patient did not attend the hear-
J G1 ing. The patient denied being mentally ill, despite 
strong evidence to the contrary. The psychiatrist 
stated that without treatment, the patient would be 
placed in a locked skilled nursing facility. With 
treatment, she may be able to return home. The 
patient was unable or unwilling to consider this 
benefit of medication. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
54 A,B, A1 
D, I 
55 A,B, B1,C1, 
C,D, D1 
E 
56 A,B A1,F1, 
GI 




SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Decision and Rationale 
Incompetent. Although the patient expressed some 
concern about side effects, the claimed side effect 
was not one that the proposed medication produc-
es. In response to questions, the patient talked on, 
rather incoherently, about other matters. Despite 
strong evidence of mental illness and inappropriate 
behavior, the patient did not acknowledge any 
mental problem. 
Incompetent. The patient did not attend the hear-
ing. The psychiatrist reported that the patient 
would not listen to information about risks and 
benefits, was isolative and hostile, and denied 
mental illness. 
Competent. Although the patient was manic and 
highly verbal, she had experienced incontinence 
from previous doses of medication that she accept-
ed during this hospitalization. Her concern about 
side effects appeared rational. 
Incompetent. Although the patient expressed con-
cern about weight gain from medication, this side 
effect does not occur from the medicine pre-
scribed. Additionally, the patient's concern about 
this side effect did not seem genuine. Finally, 
even if the patient's concern was genuine, the 
patient did not appreciate how dangerous and 
assaultive he was without medication. He was not 
rationally considering the benefits as well as the 
risks. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence Decision and Rationale 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
58 F A1 Incompetent. Although the patient expressed con-
cem about stomachaches from large dosages of 
medication, he was unwilling to consider small 
dosages even though they did not upset his stom-
ach. The patient was unwilling to acknowledge 
that his mental condition had improved from med-
ication that he took sporadically while in the hos-
pita!. 
59 A,G B1, I1 Incompetent. The patient refused medication, as-
serting that food and vitamins were sufficient. 
The psychiatrist's testimony indicated the patient 
was severely depressed and in a state of denial. 
The patient did not adequately consider the bene-
fits of mediation and was not particularly con-
cemed about the risks. 
60 A,F J1 Incompetent. According to the psychiatrist, the 
patient expressed no complaints or concerns about 
medication. At the hearing, the patient merely 
asserted that the medication was not the right 
medication or insufficient in amount, and that it 
didn't make any difference ifhe took it or not. 
He gave no explanation for rejecting medication. 
61 A,B, G1 Competent. The patient was not fluent in English. 
C,E I believe this language difficulty, not her mental 
disorder, created a lack of understanding about the 
psychiatrist's explanation of risks and benefits. 
The patient did not believe the medication was 
poison and expressed a willingness to follow the 
advice of her own (nonhospital) doctor. Her 
thought process appeared rational. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
62 A,B, A1,B1, 
D,E E1 
63 A,B, C1,D1 
E,F, 
G 
64 A,B A1,E1, 
F1 
65 A,B, B1 
F,H 




SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Decision and Rationale 
Competent. The patient spoke rationally 
about his concerns that the medication affect-
ed him adversely. Although the patient did 
not fully appreciate his mental disorder or the 
benefits of the medication, his opinion of 
how the medication affected his thinking was 
entitled to deference. 
Incompetent. The patient was unwilling to 
speak with the public defender or to attend 
the hearing. The facility representative re-
ported that the patient was out of touch with 
reality and responded to information on risks 
and benefits by claiming there was a plot 
against her. The patient voiced no concerns 
regarding side effects. No contradictory evi-
dence was offered. 
Incompetent. Although the patient had expe-
rienced side effects from the medication, she 
had no insight or appreciation of her current 
mental condition. She lacked appreciation of 
the benefits of the medication-to alleviate 
psychotic symptoms that she demonstrated at 
the hearing. 
Incompetent. The patient did not attend the 
hearing. Uncontradicted evidence was pre-
sented that the patient had been mute for one 
and one-half weeks and refused food, fluids, 
medications, and medical testing procedures. 
Her behavior indicated a suicidal intent 
caused by her major depression. 
Competent. Although the evidence clearly 
established that the patient was severely 
mentally disordered, he made a rational com-
plaint about the extrapyramidal side effects 
he was suffering. Sincere concerns about 
side effects was his sole basis for refusing 
medication. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence Decision and Rationale 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
67 A,B, A1,B1, Competent. Although the evidence convinced me 
G C1,D1, that the patient's problem was probably mental, 
E1,F1, not physical, and the patient did not appreciate 
H1 this possibility, nevertheless, the patient suffered 
a bad side effect from haloperidol and did not 
want another dose of this drug. In addition to 
this rational reason for refusing, the patient also 
relied on a finding of competence that was made 
at a hearing two days earlier. 
68 A,C, D1,H1 Incompetent. The patient did not attend the hear-
G ing. The psychiatrist's testimony established the 
patient would not listen to an explanation of 
risks and benefits because he did not believe he 
was mentally ill. The patient merely redirected 
the conversation to his legal status and asserted 
that he should not be confined in the hospital. 
He appeared unable to understand the benefits of 
medication. 
69 A,B, C1,D1, Incompetent. The patient interrupted the hearing 
E H1 on several occasions with angry and delusional 
outbursts. It became necessary to complete the 
hearing out of his presence. The psychiatrist's 
unrefuted testimony established that the patient 
suffered from delusions and was hostile. Be-
cause of his suspiciousness that hospital staff 
desired to hurt him, he was unable to evaluate 
the benefits of the proposed medication. 
70 D,F, A1 Incompetent. Although the patient attended the 
H hearing, he remained mute throughout and did 
not respond to questions as to why he refused 
treatment. The psychiatrist's unrefuted testimo-
ny established that the patient suffered from a 
major mental disorder that impaired his ability to 
understand risks and benefits of medication. The 
patient refused to decide whether to accept medi-
cation because he was afraid to make a mistake. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
71 A,B, B1,C1, 
G D1 
72 A,B, B1 
F 
73 A,B, A1,C1, 
C,G D1 




SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Decision and Rationale 
Incompetent. The patient did not attend the 
hearing. Uncontroverted testimony was present-
ed by the facility representative that the patient 
was suffering from a major mental disorder and 
a major physical disease but denied these ill-
nesses and denied the need for any medication 
to assist her. The evidence established the 
patient's psychotic thought process. 
Incompetent. The patient did not respond ra-
tionally to questions. When asked why she was 
opposed to taking medication, she stated: "Be-
cause it creates an illusion and that's Walt 
Disney." When asked what medications she 
had taken in the past, she stated: "Reality." 
Incompetent. Although the patient previously 
experienced side effects from medication and 
expressed an unwillingness to take it again be-
cause of those side effects, the patient's main 
reason for refusal was a belief that she was not 
mentally ill. She seemed clearly delusional, 
expressing a belief that she was royalty and that 
people were living within her. Her mental 
disorder prevented her from rationally consider-
ing potential benefits of the medication. 
Incompetent. The patient gave inconsistent an-
swers to questions and did not seem to have 
any appreciation for possible benefits of medi-
cation. He stated that the psychiatrists wanted 
to give him medication because they are psy-
chotic. 
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Case Facility's Patient's 
No. Evidence Evidence Decision and Rationale 
(From (From 
Table 6) Table 7) 
75 A,B, B1,G1, Competent. Although the psychiatrist's declara-
F l1 tion descnoed the patient as unable to commu-
nicate, at the hearing the patient testified in a 
mostly coherent fashion. Even prior to his 
hospitalization, the patient had a history of 
refusing medications of any kind. Further, the 
psychiatrist's declaration did not clearly indicate 
that the patient had been informed of risks and 
benefits of the proposed medication. 
76 A,B, A1,B1 Incompetent. The patient did not attend the 
C hearing. Although the patient was reported to 
have suffered side effects from a previous ad-
ministration of the proposed medication, he had 
not articulated a reason for refusing other than 
that he didn't want it. Umefuted evidence was 
presented that the patient was confused and 
disoriented. 
77 A,E A1,F1 Competent. The patient gave rational reasons 
for refusing medication. She suffered side 
effects from a previous administration of the 
proposed medication. Through her professional 
training, she understood the effects of psycho-
tropic medications. She believed that a close 
family member was over-medicated when treat-
ed for the same mental disorder. The patient 
was able to articulate why the psychiatrist want-
ed her to take the medication-to help alleviate 
her mental disorder. 
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SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
In TABLE 8, I report my decision in each hearing conducted on the 
merits275 and summarize my reasons for each decision.276 My 
decisionmaking was guided by several principles. First, my objective 
was to assess the patient's competence to perform the narrow task of 
deciding whether to accept or refuse psychotropic medication. Evidence 
of general incompetence, although relevant, was not determinative of this 
issue. For example, a psychiatrist's testimony that the patient was 
psychotic or paranoid, or that the patient's intellectual function was 
impaired, did not, by itself, establish the patient's incapacity to make 
medication decisions. Similarly, evidence of specific incompetence on 
other matters, although relevant, was not determinative of medication 
refusal competence. For example, a psychiatrist's testimony that the 
patient was dangerous or refused to eat did not, by itself, establish the 
patient's incapacity to make medication decisions. 
Second, I evaluated the patient's reasons for refusing medication and 
whether those reasons were rationally based. Generally, I regarded 
patients' concerns about side effects to be rational. However, there were 
exceptions. For example, in one hearing, the patient testified that she 
was pregnant and refused medication because of her concern about the 
effects of the medication on her unborn fetus. However, the facility 
representative introduced conclusive medical proof that the patient was 
not pregnant. I found that the patient's reasoning was irrational. 
Third, I evaluated the patient's assessment of the medication's 
potential benefits and whether that assessment was rationally based. 
Patients who did not acknowledge any mental disorder often did not 
acknowledge any medication benefits. Such denial is evidence of 
decisional incompetence, but it is not necessarily conclusive. When 
asked to do so, patients could often explain what they perceived were 
the psychiatrists' reasons for prescribing the medication. Sometimes 
275. In TABLE 8, the cases are numbered one through 77, in the order they were 
calendared for hearing. Sixty-six cases were heard on the merits. Cases that were not 
heard on the merits were omitted from the table. 
276. Because I assessed the patient's competence in each hearing, I was particularly 
interested in, and often influenced by, the patient's testimony. Thus, the reasons 
explaining my decisions reflect my evaluation of that testimony. In every hearing in 
which the patient testified, I asked questions of the patient. These questions helped 
resolve differences in the testimony introduced by the psychiatrist and the patient. 
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these explanations demonstrated that the patient had identified and 
rationally considered the medication's therapeutic potential but had 
refused treatment because medication side effects were of greater 
concern.277 
Fourth, in accordance with Riese, I imposed on the facility the burden 
of proving the patient's incapacity by clear and convincing evidence.278 
As expressed by the California Court of Appeal in a case involving a 
mental patient's capacity to give or withhold informed consent to 
electroconvulsive treatment, this burden requires proof that leaves no 
substantial doubt, i.e., proof that is "sufficiently strong to command the 
unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind."279 If a patient's 
incapacity could not be proven with such certainty, I found the patient 
competent even though his or her incompetence was·more probable.than 
not. 
Although my decisionmaking principles are easy to state, their 
application to specific cases was far more difficult. One recurring fact 
situation involved patients who offered both rational and irrational 
reasons for refusing medication. Typically, the patient would deny any 
mental disorder despite the psychiatrist's overwhelming proof that mental 
disorder existed. The denial of mental disorder led the patient to 
disclaim any benefit from medication that would treat the disorder. 
Although the patient's reasoning could be labeled irrational, the patient 
also offered rational reasons. Typically, the patient had experienced side 
effects from previous administration of medication and refused 
medication in order to avoid a reoccurrence. 
The California Court of Appeal considered the problem in a closely 
related context. In Conservatorship of Waltz,280 the patient became 
agitated and psychotic when doctors attempted to discuss electroconvul-
277. Sometimes I tested the patient's preference for avoiding side effects by 
suggesting that the patient might be detained for a longer period of time if he or she 
refused medication that the psychiatrist believed was needed to improve the patient's 
mental condition. Invariably, patients expressed a willingness. to endure extended 
commitment as preferable to medication side effects. 
In some hearings, the psychiatrist testified that he or she would order the patient 
released if the patient was found competent. When such testimony was introduced, I did 
not suggest to the patient that a medication refusal might lengthen the patient's 
detention. 
278. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1322, 271 
Cal. Rptr. 199, 21 I (1987) (republished opinion). 
279. Lillian F. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 314, 320, 206 Cal. Rptr. 603, 
606 (1984) (quoting Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 193, 58 P. 543, 544 (1899)). 
Lillian F. was cited with approval in Riese. Riese, 209 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 271 Cal. 
Rptr. at 211. 
280. 180 Cal. App. 3d 722, 227 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1986). 
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sive therapy. with him. He would not listen to their explanations.281 
However, in his nonpsychotic moments, including during his testimony, 
he understood that electroconvulsive therapy could cause memory loss 
and could kill him.282 The court, characterizing the patient's fears as 
both psychotic and rational,283 found the patient competent to make the 
treatment decision.284 
Waltz suggests that a patient's rational fears of side effects outweigh 
psychotic or irrational fears. In Waltz, however, the patient acknowl-
edged that he suffered from a mental disorder,285 and he was willing 
to take psychotropic medication to treat it.286 The disagreement 
between psychiatrist and patient as to the best course of treatment did 
not establish the patient's inability to make an informed judgment.287 
If, however, a patient does not acknowledge mental disorder or any 
potential benefit from medication, should the patient's rational concern 
about side effects trump the patient's inability to weigh medication risks 
and benefits rationally? California court decisions provide no definitive 
answer. 
Riese imposes on hearing officers the obligation to assess the patient's 
ability to understand risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, the 
proposed medication.288 Riese also imposes on the hearing officer the 
obligation to assess the patient's ability to µnderstand and evaluate the 
information about those risks, benefits, and alternatives that is required 
to be given to the patient.289 Often it was not possible to make those 
assessments. In many cases, psychiatrists had not provided patients with 
the required information. 
When psychiatrists were asked whether they informed patients of the 
potential risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, the proposed 
281. Id. at 729, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 440. 
282. Id. at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 441. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 734, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 443-45. The court reversed the trial court 
judgment that found the patient incapable of giving informed consent to electroconvul-
sive therapy. 
285. Id. at 731, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 441. 
286. Id. at 734, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 443-45. 
287. Id. 
288. Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 1322-23, 
271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 211-12 (1987) (republished opinion); see supra text accompanying 
notes 132-35. 
289. Id. at 1323, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 212; see supra text accompanying notes 136-39. 
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treatment, they answered affirmatively.290 But when they were then 
asked what they informed patients, frequently their answers did not 
support their claims of disclosure.291 In many hearings, psychiatrists 
testified that they informed patients only about medication benefits.292 
For example, in one case, the psychiatrist testified that he told the patient 
"that haloperidol would help reduce her feelings of anxiety and would 
reduce some or all of her hostility." In another case, the psychiatrist 
testified that he informed the patient that "she would feel less agitated 
and that her thinking would improve if she agreed to medications." In 
another case, the psychiatrist simply stated: "I informed the patient that 
medication would be necessary to help her with her distress and 
encouraged her to take it." 
Even when psychiatrists did discuss risks, they did not divulge "all 
information relevant to a meaningful decisional process"293 - the test 
of disclosure imposed by the California Supreme Court. To obtain a 
patient's informed consent, that test requires the psychiatrist to divulge 
all risks that are material to the patient's decision.294 Sometimes 
psychiatrists spoke about risks in general terms, informing patients that 
any medication can have detrimental as well as beneficial effects. Of 
290. Sometimes, a psychiatrist testified that he or she attempted to inform the 
patient but the patient would not listen to the psychiatrist's explanation. 
291. For example, in one hearing the psychiatrist testified that the prescribed 
medication was relatively new and that side effects had not been summarized for 
psychiatrists' use with patients. He produced the manufacturer's lengthy list of 
contraindications and side effects to demonstrate the difficulty of informing patients of 
all risks. However, he did not testify that he informed the patient of any risks. 
292. For example, in one hearing the psychiatrist testified (in a written declaration) 
that he informed the patient "that haldoperidol would help reduce her anxiety and 
paranoid feelings and would reduce some or all of her hostility." In another hearing, the 
psychiatrist testified (in a written declaration) that the patient "would feel calmer, less 
agitated, thinking would improve if she agreed to medications." In a third hearing, the 
psychiatrist testified (in a written declaration) that he informed the patient that "medicine 
might stop voices and paranoid thinking." In these written declarations, the psychiatrists 
did not assert that they informed patients about either medication risks or alternatives to 
medication. The psychiatrists did not attend the hearings, and the written declarations 
were the only evidence introduced that emanated from the treating psychiatrists. 
293. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d l, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 
(1972). 
294. The California Supreme Court summarized the physician's disclosure duty as 
follows: 
In sum, the patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's 
duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient 
possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of 
the physician's communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the 
patient's need, and that need is whatever information is material to the 
decision. Thus the test for determining whether a potential peril must be 
divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision. 
Id. at 245, 502 P.2d at 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515. 
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course, the psychiatrists asserted that the medication was prescribed for 
its beneficial effects. At other times, psychiatrists discussed some side 
effects but not others. Typically, the psychiatrist would inform the 
patient of non-neurological side effects such as sedation or anticholiner-
gic side effects, i.e., dry mouth, blurred vision, urinary retention, and 
constipation, but would omit any discussion of neurological side effects 
such as dystonia, Parkinsonism, akathisia, akinesia, and tardive 
dyskinesia. Obviously, if the risk of non-neurological side effects is 
material to a patient's decision, the risk of neurological side effects is 
likely to be more so. 
When psychiatrists disclosed the risk of neurological side effects, they 
usually sugar-coated the information.295 For example, psychiatrists 
testified that they prescribed Cogentin®296 to alleviate extrapyramidal 
side effects. They failed to mention that Cogentin® may intensify mental 
symptoms and can even precipitate a toxic psychosis.297 Cogentin® 
may aggravate symptoms of tardive dyskinesia.298 Cogentin® may also 
cause tachycardia (rapid heart beat), hyperthermia, and other anticholin-
ergic side effects.299 It is not a magic pill devoid of risks. And yet, 
psychiatrists rarely disclosed them. When psychiatrists informed patients 
about tardive dyskinesia, they mentioned that patients might experience 
uncontrollable movements but failed to disclose the irreversible nature 
of the side effect. Additionally, psychiatrists reassured patients by 
saying that tardive dyskinesia typically develops only after a lengthy 
course of treatment with psychotropic medication. They failed to 
disclose that in some cases, tardive dyskinesia develops after only a brief 
course of treatment. 300 
295. I deliberately chose the word "sugar-coated." In one hearing, in response to 
my question: "Did you treat the patient with antipsychotic medication during this 
admission?," the psychiatrist testified: "No and yes. I managed to sweet talk him into 
taking Navane® a couple of times - three days in a row." Navane® is the Roerig 
Division (of Pfizer Incorporated) brand ofthiothixene hydrochloride. PHYSICIANS' DESK 
REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 2093. 




299. 1d. at 1512-13. 
300. See, e.g., George Gardos & Jonathan 0. Cole, Overview: Public Health Issues 
in Tardive Dyskinesia, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 776, 777 (1980) (Some patients 
developed tardive dyskinesia after only a few months of medication exposure.); C. 
Thomas Gualtieri et al., Tardive Dyskinesia Litigation and the Dilemmas ofNeuroleptic 
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Sometimes psychiatrists testified that they used a written advisement 
to inform patients about medication side effects. Typically, those so-
called consent forms contained no information about risks but merely 
asserted that the prescribing physician had provided information about 
medication risks and benefits. Often those forms were used ritualistical-
ly to substitute for the process of obtaining informed consent rather than 
as evidence that informed consent was, in fact, obtained.301 A 
patient's signature on such a form did not, in and of itself, provide 
adequate proof that the required information was disclosed and that the 
patient's acquiescence was uncoerced. 
Information about side effects was usually inadequate; but information 
about alternatives to medication was usually nonexistent. A biological 
approach-medication-was the therapy of choice, and it was the only 
choice. Other treatment modalities, including psychodynamic therapy, 
group therapy, marital and family therapy, and even milieu therapy, were 
not discussed.302 Although some psychiatrists and other mental health 
professionals might view these therapies as appropriate for some 
medication-protesting patients, the psychiatrists who testified in the 
hearings I conducted did not. Although some patients might have been 
receptive to treatment with these alternative therapies, they were not 
given that choice. 
Some treating psychiatrists were rigid even in their choice of 
medication. For example, even if a patient complained of extrapyrami-
dal symptoms from Prolixin®,303 the psychiatrist would continue to 
prescribe that medication instead of another phenothiazine, such as 
Mellaril®, which is less likely to cause extrapyramidal side effects, 
although more likely to cause anticholingeric side effects.304 If the 
Treatment, 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 187, 201, 204 (1987) (Some patients on low-to-
moderate doses of psychotropic medication experienced severe tardive dyskinesia after 
only a few weeks or months of treatment.). 
301. BARBARA A. WEINER & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL 
HEALTH CARE 139 (1993). 
302. In 1984, the American Psychiatric Association published a two-volume book 
on the psychiatric therapies. Part I focused on pharmacotherapies, nutritional therapies, 
electroconvulsive therapy, and psychosurgery. COMMISSION ON PSYCHIATRIC 
THERAPIES, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, THE SOMATIC THERAPIES (1984). Part II 
focused on psychoanalysis and individual psychotherapy, group therapy, family therapy, 
behavior therapy, milieu therapy, creative therapies, psychodrama, and occupational 
therapy. COMMISSION ON PSYCHIATRIC THERAPIES, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, 
THE PSYCHOSOCIAL THERAPIES (1984). 
303. Prolixin® is the Apothecon (a Bristol-Myers Squibb Company) brand of 
fluenazine hydrochloride. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 87, at 526. 
304. Prolixin® is a high-potency medication that has primarily extrapyramidal side 
effects. Mellaril® is a low-potency medication that has primarily anticholinergic and 
sedating side effects. WALDINGER, supra note 2, at 418-19. 
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therapeutic benefits of two medications are similar, shouldn't the patient 
be given the choice of which side effects he or she is willing to endure 
to achieve that benefit? 
The failure of psychiatrists to inform patients adequately of medication 
risks and alternatives was not limited to a few isolated incidents. It was 
pervasive. Although, surely, some psychiatrists made the required 
disclosures, those psychiatrists were the exception, not the rule.305 
Even Dr. Stone admits that typically the treatment decision is a fait 
accompli before the patient is given much information. The patient is 
simply pressured to conform promptly to that fait accompli.30 
How can the decisionmaker assess the patient's competence when the 
psychiatrist has failed to provide the patient with required information 
about risks and alternatives to the proposed medication? One obvious 
answer is to find the patient competent. Even Dr. Appelbaum concedes 
that when patients are uninformed or inadequately informed, an 
assessment of their decisionmaking ability is almost always impossi-
ble.307 When the psychiatrist's breach of the information disclosure 
requirement renders an assessment of the patient's competence impossi-
ble, the facility has not sustained its burden of proving the patient's 
incompetence by clear and convincing evidence. The insufficiency of 
the evidence warrants a finding that the patient is competent. A finding 
of competence is also warranted to penalize inappropriate psychiatrist 
behavior and to induce future compliance with the disclosure obliga-
tion.308 Nevertheless, in some cases, despite the psychiatrist's failure 
305. In one hearing, the patient complained of side effects he experienced from 
Haldol®. The psychiatrist responded by expressing a willingness to prescribe Prolixin® 
or some other antipsychotic medication that might not produce the same side effects. 
The patient agreed to try the new medication. I found the patient competent, and the 
patient accepted the alternative medication. 
306. Stone, supra note 16, at xii. A researcher in Ohio found that many patients 
remember what they are told about medications that were prescribed for them, but they 
were told very little. Typically, the only side effects mentioned were nausea and 
drowsiness. Lisa A. Callahan, Changing Mental Health Law: Butting Heads with a 
Billygoat, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 305, 314 (1986); see also Hargreaves et al., supra 
note 11, at 191 (Fewer than six of the 51 patients interviewed were able to state the 
benefits and risks of the prescribed medication.). 
307. Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 128, at 1637. 
308. California statutes require that patients detained on 72-hour holds be informed 
of medication benefits, risks, and alternatives. These statutes specifically preclude 
release of patients for failure to provide the required information. CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE§§ 5152(c), 5213(b) (West Supp. 1995). Nevertheless, psychotropic medication 
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to provide required information, the available evidence clearly estab-
lished the patient's incompetence, and I so held. A hearing officer's 
function is to determine the patient's competence to refuse treatment, not 
to exact punishment for a psychiatrist's transgression. 
Undoubtedly, my consideration of evidence and my decisionmaking 
were influenced by the widespread nondisclosure practice. For example, 
in over 30% of the combined Group A and Group B cases, the patient 
testified that he or she did not trust, or was angry at, the psychiatrist. 
Typically, the psychiatrist testified that such hostility was due to 
paranoia--a symptom of the patient's mental disorder. Before accepting 
such explanation, however, I attempted to determine whether the hostility 
was attributable to the psychiatrist's refusal to involve the patient in the 
process of treatment decisionmaking. Was the patient's hostility a 
rational response. to the psychiatrist's failure to provide information 
about medication risks and to address the patient's concerns about those 
risks? 
Similarly, when patients refused medication because they had 
previously experienced medication side effects, I was sympathetic to 
their concern. For example, during one hearing, the patient described 
and then demonstrated a dystonic reaction that he had suffered from 
medication.309 He was terrified by the experience. The patient's 
concern was genuine and was based in reality. If he had been fully 
informed of other potential side effects, he probably would have been 
even more reluctant to accept medication. Although the patient had not 
considered the potential benefits of medication, I concluded that even if 
he had rationally considered them, he would.not have changed his mind. 
Under such circumstances, I found the patient competent. 
A patient's prior experience with medication side effects or the failure 
of the psychiatrist to disclose other side effects did not always outweigh 
the patient's failure to consider medication benefits. For example, in one 
case, the patient testified that he suffered side effects-"shaky nervous-
ness," dry mouth, and muscle stiffness--when previously treated with 
psychotropic medication. He refused medication now because he did not 
wish to suffer those side effects again. However, the patient had stopped 
eating, was suffering severe malnutrition, and was profoundly dehydrat-
ed. He claimed that he did not eat only because he lacked an appetite. 
Medication was prescribed to relieve the patient's psychosis so that he 
would start eating and drinking. In this case, I found the patient 
may only be administered to medication-refusing patients if they are found mentally 
incapable of refusing that treatment. Id. § 5332(b ). 
309. See supra note 264 (describing dystonic reaction). 
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incompetent. The patient's failure to consider how medication might 
benefit him could have disastrous consequences. Not only would his 
mental condition continue unimproved, but his physical condition would 
continue to deteriorate dangerously. Under such circumstances, the 
patient's failure to weigh medication benefits against medication risks 
was irrational. 
IV. CONCLUSION: ASSURING COMPETENT PATIENTS THEIR RIGHT 
TO REFUSE TREATMENT 
To implement the Riese decision in San Diego County, lawyers were 
appointed as temporary judges to conduct competency hearings. The 
legislature converted those judicial hearings into administrative capacity 
hearings but continued to require that the hearing officers be law trained. 
Hearings have been conducted, and are being conducted today, without 
significant problems or costs. Hearings are conducted within forty-eight 
hours of their request. The facility is represented by the treating 
psychiatrist or, if that individual is not available, by another treatment 
staff person who introduces into evidence the treating psychiatrist's 
declaration. The patient is represented by the public defender or the 
patient advocate. A typical hearing is completed within thirty to forty 
minutes, and, at the hearing's conclusion, the hearing officer announces 
a decision and reasons for the decision. Patients found incompetent can 
be treated without further delay. Although hearings are performed 
expeditiously, they are not performed perfunctorily. During a three-year 
period, law-trained decisionmakers in San Diego County found patients 
competent in 20 to 25% of the hearings. 
Efficiency is but one consideration. More importantly, law-trained 
decisionmakers are nee.ded to assure due process. Doctors are trained to 
diagnose and treat illness. When they assess a patient's capacity to 
refuse medication, they are unduly influenced by their own assessment 
of the medication's anticipated benefit to the patient they are treat-
ing.310 For this reason, they are not suited to serve as impartial judges 
of the patient's competence. Even Dr. Appelbaum admitted, "When 
physicians act as judges, they still tend to think like physicians."311 
310. Zito et al., supra note 250, at 826. . . 
311. Appelbaum, supra note 10, at 417; see also Hargreaves et al., supra note 11, 
at 191-92. When independent psychiatrists reviewed medication refusal decisions, they 
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My experience as a hearing officer confirms Dr. Appelbaum's 
observation. Most psychiatrists equated incompetence with either their 
finding of mental disorder or the patient's unwillingness to acknowledge 
mental disorder. When psychiatrists made a professional judgment that 
a medication was medically appropriate to treat the patient's disorder, 
they often viewed any patient objections as irrational. They failed to 
consider whether the patient had made a rational assessment of risks, 
benefits, and alternatives, and to decide the patient's competence using 
those criteria. Psychiatrists not only performed as biased judges, they 
practiced bias in relating to their patients. When psychiatrists withheld 
or otherwise manipulated information about risks and alternatives,· they 
undermined their patients' abilities to make competent decisions.312 
The legislature has imposed on psychiatrists the duty to disclose to 
.their patients the risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, psychotropic 
medications they prescribe.313 Psychiatrists must not be allowed to 
ignore or circumvent their disclosure obligation. The requirement of 
informed consent is not an interference with medical 'practice; it is a 
prerequisite to it. A law-trained decisionmaker can, and should, demand 
that the patient be provided with adequate information. When such 
information has not been provided, law-trained decisionmakers can, and
in appropriate cases should, find that the evidence is insufficient to prove 
the patient's incompetence. 
The problem of information nondisclosure is not resolved, however, 
by the use of law-trained decisionmakers in capacity hearings. Those 
hearings are co11ducted only for patients who adamantly refuse treatment. 
Such patients are few in number. In San Diego County, during the 
approved the administration of medication in 98.9% of the cases. Id. at 192. "The 
reviews did not reduce the average dose of antipsychotic medication received by 
involuntary patients, did not make it easier for patients to successfully refuse medication, 
and did not seem to be visible to patients as a new right or animprovement in their 
situation." Id. at 191. 
312. John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis 
of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 129, 132 (1991); see also 
Roth, supra note 23, at 143 ("Information is given to patients largely to achieve their 
compliance, not to involve the patient in decision making."). To make a competent 
decision, a patient must analyze relevant information in terms of his or her own 
knowledge, beliefs, and goals. Carroll, supra at 132. 
313. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5152(c), 5213(b) (West Supp. 1995). These 
statutes require that risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, proposed medication be 
disclosed to involuntary mental patients during the initial 72-hour detention period. See 
also id. § 5332(a). In addition to requiring disclosure of information about risks, 
benefits, and alternatives, this statute requires disclosure of the patient's right to refuse 
medication. See also id. § 5326.2 (West 1984) (listing the information that must be 
provided patients to obtain their informed consent); see supra text accompanying notes 
138-39. 
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twelve-month period of July 1990 through June 1991, 4,077 patients 
were detained on seventy-two-hour holds and 1,904 patients were 
detained on fourteen-day holds.314 During that twelve-month period, 
only 146 capacity hearings were conducted on the merits.315 The 
overwhelming number of patients either consented or did not object to 
treatment. Who demanded that psychiatrists meet their information 
disclosure obligation to these patients? There was no one. What 
safeguards assured that patient decisions accepting treatment were 
voluntary, informed, and competent? There_ were none. 
The information disclosure requirement can be strengthened through 
litigation, legislation, ·and administrative regulation. For example: (1) 
Instead of allowing treatment to proceed on nonobjecting patients, 
written, informed consent should_ be required from any patient before 
treatment can be administered. Currently, voluntary mental patients must 
give such consent.316 Why should competent involuntary mental 
patients receive any less protection? (2) The forms used to document a 
patient's consent are often inadequate. They merely state that the 
psychiatrist has disclosed required information. Those forms should be 
modified to require the psychiatrist to record the information that was 
actually disclosed. (3) When a psychiatrist medicates an objecting 
patient in an emergency, he or she should be required to justify the 
decision by documenting the specific facts that, in the psychiatrist's 
judgment, warranted the coerced treatment. (4) The Patients' Advocate, 
acting as the person responsible for ensuring that mental patients are 
afforded their rights, should be required to monitor the informed consent 
process, to investigate individual patient complaints of abuse, and to 
compel appropriate corrective actions.317 
The coerced treatment of competent mental patients will not be 
eliminated solely by changes in laws or rules. What is needed is a 
change in attitude. Psychiatrists do not treat mental disorders; they treat 
314. PERFORMANCE OUTCOME AND REPORTING SECTION, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF 
MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT NO. 93-02, SUMMARY OF INVOLUNTARY DETENTIONS IN 
COUNTY DESIGNATED FACILITIES AND STATE HOSPITALS FOR THE MENTALLY DISABLED, 
FISCAL YEAR 1990-91 (1993). Statewide, 78,548 adults (plus 5717 children) were 
detained on 72-hour holds, and 33,266 patients were detained on 14-day holds during the 
July 1990 through June 1991 period. 
315. RIESE HEARINGS STATISTICAL REPORT #3, supra note 233. Statewide data on 
capacity hearings is not available. See supra text accompanying notes 231-32. 
316. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 851 (1995). 
317. Id.§§ 863(b), 863.l(a), 863.2(4)-(5). 
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people with mental disorders.318 Those people are entitled to make 
their own decisions. When patients refuse treatment, psychiatrists must 
resist the urge to pressure them into complying "for their own 
good."319 Medical paternalism-doctor knows best-must be replaced 
by acceptance of patient autonomY-1)atient knows best. As Dr. Stone 
warned, the unwillingness of psychiatrists to accept "informed consent 
is symptomatic of a more serious disorder in the healing relation-
ship. "320 
Grudging acceptance of patient autonomy is not enough. Psychiatrists 
should not merely defer to competent decisions of their patients, they 
should actively promote competent decisionmaking by their patients. 
Psychiatrists do so when they fully disclose information on the risks of, 
and alternatives to, the medication they prescribe. Patient empowerment 
is not only socially desirable, it is therapeutically desirable as well.321 
Patient choice increases the patient's satisfaction and confidence in the 
treatment process.322 Patient choice promotes the patient's trust of, 
and confidence in, the therapist. 323 A therapeutic alliance can not be 
achieved by forcing therapeutic compliance. 
An American Psychiatric Association resource document, approved by 
the Association's Board of Trustees, urges psychiatrists, as a matter of 
good medical practice, ''to maximize the patient's participation in the 
treatment decisionmaking process; and, if the patient registers objections, 
to try to understand the basis for these objections and take them into 
account in formulating a treatment plan."324 If patient participation 
becomes the standard of medical practice, informed consent will no 
longer be a burden that the law imposes on psychiatrists, but rather, an 
318. The American Psychiatric Association has cautioned that the classification of 
mental disorders does not classify people but only the disorders that people have. Thus, 
for example, a person with schizophrenia should not be referred to as "a schizophrenic." 
DSM-IV, supra note 239, at xxii. 
319. Nathan T. Sidley, The Right of Involuntary Patients in Mental Institutions to 
Refuse Drug Treatment, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 231, 241 (1984). 
320. Stone, supra note 16, at xiii.· 
321. Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Analysis, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99 (1994) [hereinafter Winick, 
A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis]; see also Bruce J. Winick, Competency to 
Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. 
REV. 15, 46-53 (1991). 
322. See Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, supra note 321, at 100-11 
(discussing psychological research). 
323. See id. at 111-16. 
324. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION 
RESOURCE DOCUMENT 3 (1989). Although the Resource Document was approved by 
the Board of Trustees, it does not represent official policy of the American Psychiatric 
Association. 
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opportunity for a true therapeutic alliance that psychiatrists willingly 
offer their patients. 
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